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SUMMARY IN FINNISH 
Viime vuosikymmeninä sekä Pohjoisen jäämeren rannikkovaltiot että sisämaavaltiot ovat 
osittaneet kasvavaa kiinnostusta arktista aluetta kohtaan. Joidenkin arvioiden mukaan arkti-
sella alueella voi olla jopa 90 miljardia tynnyriä öljyä ja noin kolmasosa maailman kartoitta-
mattomista maakaasuvaroista. Rannikkovaltiot (Kanada, Norja, Tanska, USA ja Venäjä) ovat 
lisänneet pyrkimyksiään laajentaa toimivaltaansa yksinomaisten talousvyöhykkeidensä ulko-
puolisille merialueille, joihin Arktisen neuvoston kolmen muun jäsenvaltion (Islannin, Ruotsin 
ja Suomen) kiinnostus myös kohdistuu. Myös arktisen alueen ulkopuoliset maat (mm. Euroo-
pan unioni, Kiina) ovat osoittaneet lisääntyvää kiinnostusta aluetta kohtaan. Ihmisen toimin-
nasta aiheutuvien kielteisten vaikutusten vähentämiseksi arktisella alueella keskeisenä 
tavoitteena on arktisen ympäristön hoito ja ennen kaikkea öljyvahinkojen estäminen meri- ja 
ranta-alueilla samoin kuin ilmansaasteiden, mm. pysyvien orgaanisten yhdisteiden, torjunta. 
Arktisen alueen ympäristönsuojelua varten ei ole vielä kehitetty omia erityisiä määräyksiä. 
Tässä suhteessa YK:n merioikeusyleissopimus voisi toimia yleisenä kehyksenä. 
Tällä hetkellä arktinen alue on tulevan kehityksensä taitekohdassa. Meillä näyttäisi olevan 
kaksi vaihtoehtoa – joko laaja kansainvälinen yhteistyö, joka tähtää ihmisen ja luonnon rin-
nakkaiseloon, herkän arktisen ekosysteemin kestävään kehitykseen ja lukuisten alkuperäis-
kansojen elämänlaadun parantamiseen, tai uusi alueellinen ”kylmä sota” – oikeudelliset risti-
riidat, lisääntyvät kiistat alueen hallinnasta ja sotilaallinen läsnäolo. Valitsemamme tie 
määrittelee tämän hyvin mutkikkaan, haavoittuvan ja dynaamisen alueen tulevan kohtalon. 
Vaikka arktisen alueen täydellinen demilitarisointi onkin epätodennäköistä, Venäjän ja Norjan 
hiljattain aikaansaama rajasopimus pitkään kiistellyllä Jäämeren alueella on askel oikeaan 
suuntaan kohti uutta kansainvälistä sopimusta, jonka avulla voitaisiin ratkaista Barentsin-
meren merkittävien öljy- ja kaasuvarantojen hyödyntäminen ja arktisen alueen kansainväli-
nen hallinto. 
Arktisen alueen ilmastolla on merkittävä vaikutus Suomen ja muiden Pohjoismaiden nykyi-
seen ja tulevaan ilmastoon. Satelliittikuvista on havaittu, että Jäämeren jääpeite on supistu-
nut 1970-luvun lopulta lähtien. Euraasian pohjoisten merialueiden sulaminen tekee toden-
näköisesti mahdolliseksi avata lyhyempi laivareitti Euroopan, Aasian ja Tyynen valtameren 
välille ja hyödyntää arktisen merenpohjan mahdollisesti valtavia luonnonvaroja, mm. öljyä, 
kaasua, mineraaleja ja kalakantoja. Arktisen alueen laivaväylät saadaan mahdollisesti myös 
kauppamerenkulun ja matkailun käyttöön. On kuitenkin olemassa monia haasteita, jotka 
voivat rajoittaa merenkulun tulevaa kehitystä arktisella alueella. Näitä ovat laivaväylien hal-
linta, keskeisen infrastruktuurin puute ja aluksia koskevien standardien harmonisointi. Esi-
merkiksi arktisen alueen merenkulun arviointiraportissa (AMSA) (Arktinen neuvosto, 2009) 
todetaan, että vuonna 2020 suurin osa arktisen alueen liikenteestä kohdistuu edelleen tiettyi-
hin satamiin koko arktisen alueen poikki kulkevan liikenteen sijaan. 
Arviot jään sulamisen vauhdista ja laajuudesta eroavat huomattavasti toisistaan: yhtäällä on 
kansainvälisen ilmastopaneelin IPCC:n neljänteen raporttiin perustuva vakiintunut näkemys, 
toisaalla venäläisten ja muiden riippumattomien tutkimusryhmien esittämät arviot. IPCC:n 
ennusteet viittaavat siihen, että jään sulaminen jatkuu koko tämän vuosisadan ja loppukesän 
jääpeite katoaa lähes kokonaan ennustusjakson loppua lähestyttäessä. Vaihtoehtoisissa las-
kelmissa (joita on laadittu esimerkiksi Venäjän arktisessa ja antarktisessa instituutissa) 
ennustetaan, että Jäämeren jääalueen dynamiikka jatkuu vaihtelevana (ilman tiettyä kehitys-
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trendiä). Syynä tähän ovat ensisijaisesti ilmastosyklien ja pitkän aikavälin trendien alueelliset 
erityispiirteet. Riippumatta siitä, mitkä ennustukset osoittautuvat oikeiksi, meri on lähivuosi-
kymmeninä jään peitossa suuren osan vuotta, ja tämän vuoksi pääsy arktiselle alueelle, 
muun muassa Luoteisväylälle ja pohjoiselle merireitille, riippuu myös jatkossa jääolosuhteista. 
Ikiroudan sulaminen laajoilta alueilta Pohjois-Euraasiasta voisi johtaa hiilipäästöjen (erityisesti 
metaanin) voimakkaaseen kasvuun. Tämä palautemekanismi voisi kiihdyttää arktisen alueen 
lämpenemistä merkittävästi ja vaikuttaa maapallon ilmaston toimintaan johtaen päästö-
määriin, jotka ovat vähintään yhtä suuret kuin tropiikin metsien hävittämisestä nykyisin 
aiheutuvat päästöt. Lisäksi routakausi lyhenee tämän vuosisadan loppupuolella. Keski- ja 
Pohjois-Suomessa roudan vuotuinen maksimisyvyys pienenee. Vaikka tämä ei poistakaan 
rakennusten ja rakenteiden suojaamistarvetta kokonaan, se voi vähentää tätä tarvetta, mikä 
puolestaan alentaa kustannuksia rakennus- ja kuljetusalalla. Toisaalta roudan vähenemisellä 
voi olla metsäteollisuuden kannalta kielteisiä vaikutuksia puunkorjuun vaikeutumisen myötä. 
Euraasian mantereen pohjoisten alueiden ja niihin (varsinkin lännessä) liittyvien merien 
uskotaan lämpenevän huomattavasti koko tämän vuosisadan ajan. Tähän liittyy myös sade-
määrien kasvu. Ilmastonmuutoksella on kuitenkin sekä myönteisiä että kielteisiä vaikutuksia 
näihin alueisiin. Välittömiä vaikutuksia ovat muun muassa: 
 Useisiin eläinlajeihin (jääkarhut, hylkeet, mursut, pohjoiset kauriseläimet ja meri-
linnut) kohdistuu kielteisiä vaikutuksia ja jopa lajien olemassaoloa koskevia uhkia; 
 Suuret metsäpalot ja hyönteisten joukkoesiintymiset tulevat yleisemmiksi ja 
vaikeammiksi torjua eritoten Pohjois-Aasian itäisillä manneralueilla; 
 Ilmaston lisääntynyt vaihtelu vaikuttaa maanpäällisten ekosysteemien elinvoimaisuu-
teen ja tuottoisuuteen. Kuivilla kesillä ja leudoilla talvilla on silminnähden kielteisiä 
vaikutuksia ekosysteemeihin. Lämpeneminen vaikuttaa järvien vedenlämpöön ja 
jäänalaisen ympäristön laatuun, mikä todennäköisesti alentaa vesistöjen ekosystee-
mien tuottavuutta; 
 Merien ekosysteemit ovat myös hyvin haavoittuvia. Lämpötilan kohoamisen ja 
jääpeitteen vähenemisen vaikutuksesta eri kalalajien levinneisyyden rajat liikkuvat 
pohjoiseen. Ilmastonmuutos voi johtaa eksoottisten lajien leviämiseen, lisätä kilpailua 
ja kiihdyttää rehevöitymistä ja saastumista. Joillekin arktisille alueille odotetaan suo-
tuisampia oloja, jotka lisäävät rehuvarantoja, laajentavat tiettyjen kalalajien liikkuma-
aluetta, tehostavat kalastusta ja lisäävät arvokkaiden kaupallisten lajien vaellusta; 
 Jääpeitteen väheneminen helpottaa pääsyä arktisen alueen mannerjalustoille. Ennus-
tettu ilmastonmuutos ei kuitenkaan vähennä vaarallisia hydrometeorologisia ilmiöitä 
arktisella alueella vaan ainoastaan jakaa ne uudella tavalla (kovien tuulten nostatta-
mien aaltojen lisääntynyt todennäköisyys, ajojään kulkeutuminen uusille alueille 
jne.); 
 On hyvin todennäköistä, että vaarallisten sääilmiöiden lukumäärä ja voimakkuus 
lisääntyvät (kovat tuulet, lumimyrskyt, jäiset tiet, merialueiden heikentyvät jäät jne.); 
 Tällä vuosisadalla arktisilla rannikkoalueilla koettavia vaikutuksia ovat muun muassa 
nopeampi merenpinnan nousu (0,18–0,59 m) (IPCC 2007), meren pintalämpötilan 
kohoaminen, sään ääri-ilmiöiden ja myrskypuuskien lisääntyminen, sademäärissä 
tapahtuvat muutokset ja meren happamoituminen; 
 Vaikutukset koskettavat matkailua, elinolosuhteita ja väestön terveyttä, erityisesti 
kaukana pohjoisessa asuvien ihmisten keskuudessa; 
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 Lämmityksen tarve voi vähentyä ja korvautua joissakin tapauksissa suuremmalla 
jäähdytystarpeella. Lisääntynyt ilmastollinen vaihtelu vaikeuttaa yleiseen lämpene-
miseen perustuvien pitkän aikavälin strategioiden saavuttamista ja vähentää näiden 
strategioiden mahdollisia etuja. 
Yleisesti ottaen odotetulla ilmastonmuutoksella on enemmän myönteisiä vaikutuksia Pohjois-
maissa (erityisesti Suomessa) kuin Pohjois-Euraasian muilla alueilla. Näitä vaikutuksia voivat 
olla muun muassa: 
 Vuotuisen sademäärän kasvu hyödyttää vesivoiman tuotantoa. Odotettavissa on 
kuitenkin enemmän vaarallisia tulvia ja ylipäätään voimakkaampia virtauksia, joilla on 
vaikutuksia maa- ja vesirakennustöihin; 
 Ilmastonmuutos avaa uusia mahdollisuuksia Suomen maataloudelle. Lämpimämpi 
ilmasto pidentää termistä kasvukautta ja nopeuttaa fysiologisia prosesseja. Tämän 
ansiosta yleisesti kasvatettujen lajien viljelyaloja voidaan laajentaa ja pääasiallisten 
viljelykasvien satomahdollisuudet paranevat. Myös uusia lajeja päästään viljelemään. 
Parempien satomahdollisuuksien toteutuminen edellyttää erityisiä sopeutumistoimia; 
 Metsien kasvu ja tuottavuus nousevat. Ilmastonmuutos ja asianmukainen metsän-
hoito voisivat lisätä Suomen metsien sitomaa hiiltä jopa kolmanneksen. Kasvuolo-
suhteet ovat suosiollisemmat, erityisesti lehtipuille. Hyönteisten aiheuttamien metsä-
vaurioiden odotetaan kuitenkin leviävän kauemmas pohjoiseen. Lämpimän sään 
jaksot talvella voivat saada aikaan epäsuotuisia fysiologisia vaikutuksia. Puunkorjuu 
vaikeutuu. Metsäpalojen riskin odotetaan kasvavan vuosisadan loppuun mennessä, 
erityisesti Etelä-Suomessa. 
 Vuoteen 2020 mennessä pohjoisen merireitin vuotuisten liikennemäärien odotetaan 
kasvavan 1,5 tonnista 40 tonniin. Suuremmat liikennemäärät laskevat liikennöinti-
maksuja, jotka ovat tällä hetkellä suhteellisen korkeita pohjoisella merireitillä. 
Globaali muutos alueilla, joilla ilmastonmuutoksen kielteiset vaikutukset tulevat selvästi näky-
viin, voi johtaa sosiaalisiin ja taloudellisiin ongelmiin. Nämä liittyvät hallitsemattomaan 
muuttoliikkeeseen, ympäristön köyhtymiseen ja energian ja raaka-aineiden tuotannon las-
kuun, millä on taloudellista merkitystä myös Suomelle. 
Arktisen alueen tuleva sosioekonominen kehitys riippuu valtioiden noudattaman politiikan 
tehokkuudesta ja niistä ohjelmista, joilla hillitään ilmastonmuutoksen vaikutuksia ja sopeu-
dutaan niihin. On hyvin todennäköistä, että nämä eroavat huomattavasti toisistaan Pohjois-
maissa ja Venäjällä. Suomessa kestävän kehityksen politiikka ja ohjelmat ovat hyvin kehitty-
neitä ja niiden toteutuksessa on onnistuttu1. Tämä antaa aihetta olettaa, että ilmastonmuutos 
ei vaikuta merkittävästi maan yhteiskunnallis-taloudelliseen kehitykseen seuraavien kahden 
kolmen vuosikymmenen aikana. Ilmastoennusteisiin sisältyvä huomattava epävarmuus vaatii 
kuitenkin, että yhdenmukaistamisstrategioita tehostetaan edelleen, jotta epäjohdonmukaisiin 
ja usein ristiriitaisiin ilmastoskenaarioihin liittyvät riskit ja menetykset voidaan minimoida. 
Ilmakehän hiilidioksidikuorman vähentämisen tulisi olla perusta kaikille ilmastopakotteen hil-
lintään tähtääville mielekkäille toimille. Mutta vaikka CO2-päästöissä saataisiinkin aikaan 
pikaista ja merkittävää alenemista, arktisella alueella tapahtuva nopea sulaminen (IPCC:n 
                                               
1    Ilmastonmuutoksen kansallinen sopeutumisstrategia, 2005; Kansallinen kestävän kehityksen 
strategia, 2006; Suomen kehityspoliittinen ohjelma, 2007; Kansallinen ilmasto- ja energiastrategia, 
2008; Kansallinen luonnonvarastrategia, 2009. 
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ennusteen mukaan) ei välttämättä hidastu, koska hiilidioksidi säilyy ilmakehässä pitkään. On 
kuitenkin myös ilmastopakotteeseen vaikuttavia tekijöitä, jotka ovat lyhytikäisempiä kuin 
CO2. Näitä ovat muun muassa musta hiili (epätäydellisestä palamisesta aiheutuvat hiukkaset 
eli noki), troposfäärin otsoni sekä metaani (CH4). Koska nämä yhdisteet säilyvät ilmakehässä 
lyhyemmän aikaa kuin hiilidioksidi, niiden pitoisuuksissa aikaansaatu pieneneminen tuntuu 
paljon nopeammin kuin pitkäikäisten kasvihuonekaasujen päästöjen vähentäminen. 
Mustan hiilen vähenemisen vaikutukset ovat voimakkaampia arktisella alueella kuin missään 
muualla, koska lumen ja jään suuri albedo lisää säteilyn heijastumista, jota mustan hiilen 
laskeumat puolestaan taas vähentävät. Kun tarkastellaan ainoastaan Eurooppaa, arktisen 
alueen ilmansaastetasoihin vaikuttavat eniten Euroopan pohjoisimpien maiden päästöt: 
ensimmäisenä tulee Norja ja sen jälkeen Suomi ja Ruotsi. Mustan hiilen päästöjen vähentä-
minen voi olla keino hidastaa arktisen alueen lämpenemistä, lyhentää sulamiskautta ja 
rajoittaa palauteilmiöitä. 
Suurin osa arktiselle alueelle kulkeutuvasta mustasta hiilestä on peräisin dieselpolttoaineista, 
avotulesta (peltojen kulotuksesta ja metsäpaloista) ja kotitalouksien käyttämistä kiinteistä 
polttoaineista (mm. biomassasta). Öljyn ja kaasun etsintä pohjoisilla leveysasteilla on myös 
mahdollinen suuri päästölähde (tosin määrältään vielä huonosti tunnettu).  
Suomessa suurimpia mustan hiilen päästölähteitä ovat kuljetukset (maanteillä ja maastossa) 
ja kotitaloudet (lähinnä puun poltto). Missään nykyisin voimassa olevista laeista ei keskitytä 
erityisesti mustan hiilen vähentämiseen, vaikka sen vähentämistä onkin käsitelty monissa 
poliittisissa aloitteissa (Arktisessa neuvostossa, Euroopan talouskomissiossa, YK:n ympäristö-
ohjelmassa). Koska mustan hiilen päästöt kuitenkin tapahtuvat samassa yhteydessä kuin 
joidenkin muiden nykyisten lakien kattamien aineiden päästöt, on odotettavissa, että pääs-
töjä saadaan vähennettyä monilla aloilla useimmissa arktisen alueen maissa, myös 
Suomessa. 
Arktisen neuvoston kaikkien jäsenmaiden päästöjen vertailu osoittaa, että Suomen osuus 
arktiseen alueeseen vaikuttavista kokonaispäästöistä on vain muutama prosentti. Tämän 
vuoksi Suomi ei selvästikään pysty yksin saamaan aikaan merkittäviä vähennyksiä päästöissä 
tai säteilypakotteessa. Tarvitaan yhteisiä kansainvälisiä toimia, joita onkin parhaillaan käyn-
nissä muun muassa Arktisen neuvoston piirissä. Eri maissa on erilainen päästörakenne, ja 
siksi yhteisessä päästövähennysstrategiassa on otettava nämä erot huomioon. Lisäksi kan-
sainvälisen meriliikenteen aiheuttamat päästöt arktisella alueella voivat lisääntyä huomatta-
vasti, jos jään sulamista koskevat ennusteet toteutuvat. Tämä puolestaan edellyttäisi, että 
kehitetään strategia rajoittamaan arktisen alueen laivaliikenteen päästöjä. 
Venäjä on Suomen merkittävä kauppakumppani, jonka tärkeimmät vientituotteet Suomeen 
ovat energia, tietyt metallit ja raakapuu. Ennakoitu ilmastonmuutos Venäjän napa-alueilla ja 
havumetsävyöhykkeellä vaikuttaa ympäristöön ja vientiteollisuuteen eri tavoin. Ilmaston-
muutos yleensä ja talvien lämpeneminen erityisesti helpottavat tuotantoprosesseja. Saman-
aikaisesti ikiroudan sulaminen hankaloittaa infrastruktuurin, erityisesti putkistojen ja teiden 
kehittämistä, lisää onnettomuuksia ja kasvattaa nykyisen infrastruktuurin ylläpitokustannuk-
sia, mikä lopulta johtaa vientihintojen nousuun. 
Venäjällä on merkittäviä yhteiskunnallis-taloudellisia ongelmia, jotka vaikeuttavat Venäjän 
arktisten alueiden kestävää kehitystä ja tätä myötä vahvistavat ilmastonmuutoksen kielteisiä 
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seurauksia. Venäjän polttavimpia ongelmia ovat muun muassa: (1) lisääntyvä jälkeenjäänei-
syys pohjoisten alueiden yhteiskunnallis-taloudellisessa kehityksessä; (2) väestöpohjan 
supistuminen (korkea kuolleisuus, alhainen syntyvyys, muuttoliike, ikääntyminen jne.); (3) 
kuljetusjärjestelmien vanhentuneisuus; (4) uuden kilpailukykyisen ja ekologisesti puhtaan 
teollisuustekniikan puute; (5) mineraalivarojen etsinnän supistuminen; (6) alkuperäiskansojen 
perinteisen elinkeinojen häviäminen ja (7) alueella tuotetun tiedon ja tieteellisen osaamisen 
huomattava väheneminen. 
Ilmastonmuutos vahvistaa näitä kielteisiä kehityssuuntauksia, ellei arktisten alueiden kansal-
lista politiikkaa muokata välittömästi. Venäjän hallituksen viimeaikaiset päätökset viittaavat 
siihen, että Venäjä aikoo käydä käsiksi arktisten alueidensa kiireellisimpiin infrastruktuuria 
koskeviin ongelmiin. Tämän onnistuminen edellyttää kuitenkin merkittäviä sijoituksia ja huo-
mattavaa kansainvälistä panosta. 
Oletettavissa on, että venäläisen puun kysyntä ei laske merkittävästi Suomessa seuraavien 
kahden kolmen vuosikymmenen aikana. Ilmastonmuutoksen vaikutukset Venäjän metsiin 
ovat erilaisia Luoteis-Venäjällä (josta suurin osa Suomen nykyisestä ja tulevasta tuonnista on 
peräisin) ja Aasian puoleisella havumetsävyöhykkeellä. Kummallakin alueella on valtavat met-
sävarat. Euroopan puoleisilla pohjoisilla alueilla ilmastonmuutoksen odotetaan olevan keski-
määrin samanlainen kuin Itämeren maissa. Alueen metsäteollisuuden suurimpia ongelmia 
ovat tehokkaan metsänhoidon puute, erittäin heikko infrastruktuuri ja vanhentunut kone-
kanta ja tekniikka. Näin ollen metsäsektorin tuleva kehitys ja vientimahdollisuudet riippuvat 
pitkälti Venäjän tulevasta talous- ja yhteiskuntapolitiikasta, joissa edistys on edelleen hidasta. 
Ilmastonmuutoksen vaikutukset Siperian metsiin ovat rajumpia. Vakavat luonnon vaarateki-
jät, ennen kaikkea metsäpalot ja hyönteisten joukkoesiintymiset, muodostavat todellisen 
uhan metsien hyvinvoinnille. Infrastruktuurin ongelmat ovat akuutimpia Siperiassa kuin 
Euroopan puolella pohjoisessa. Jäämeren laivareitin avaaminen mahdollistaisi kuitenkin 
arvokkaan kuljetusväylän Siperian ”varaston” tarjoamille monille eri tuotteille Pohjois-Euroop-
paan. Arktisen alueen laivareitteihin kohdistuu myös haasteita, jotka voivat tehdä liikenteen 
harjoittamisen kannattamattomaksi. Näitä ovat muun muassa korkeat vakuutusmaksut, infra-
struktuurin puute, ankarat olot, ajojään ja jäävuorien aiheuttamat ongelmat sekä joidenkin 
väylien mataluus. Arktisen alueen meriliikenteen tulevalla kehityksellä on myös muita esteitä, 
jotka liittyvät erityisesti hallintoon ja infrastruktuuriin. Ratkaistavia kysymyksiä ovat arktisten 
laivareittien laillinen asema, sitovien ja yhtenäisten laivanrakennusstandardien puute, rajalli-
set radio- ja satelliittiyhteydet alueella ja avoimet kysymykset jotka koskevat alusten liikkei-
den seurantaa ja valvontaa arktisella alueella. Tuleva globaali yhteiskunnallis-taloudellinen 
epävarmuus on merkittävä tekijä, joka määrittää energiakaupan geopolitiikkaa varsinkin 
Venäjän kaltaisen huomattavan energianviejän osalta. Nykyiset arviot epätavanomaisista ja 
uusista energiavaroista (muun muassa vasta löydetyistä arktisen alueen öljystä ja kaasusta) 
osoittavat, että ei niinkään energiavarojen rajallisuus, vaan taloudellista hyödynnettävyyttä ja 
ympäristöä koskevat kysymykset saavat energiantuojia (kuten Suomea) harkitsemaan siirty-
mistä muihin energianlähteisiin. Fossiilisten polttoaineiden hinnat todennäköisesti nousevat 
energian kysynnän kasvaessa ja edullisten fossiilisten polttoaineiden varantojen vähitellen 
ehtyessä, erityisesti kun otetaan huomioon yhä tiukemmat ilmastovaatimukset. Fossiilisten 
polttoaineiden nykyiset vaihtoehdot ovat kalliita, ja niin kauan kuin ei ole olemassa teknisiä 
innovaatioita, jotka alentaisivat niiden kustannuksia, vaikutukset Venäjän kaltaisiin energian-
viejiin pysyvät vähäisinä. 
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Jotta ilmaston tila saataisiin vakaaksi, hiilen käytön tulisi vähentyä nopeasti ja olisi otettava 
käyttöön useita kaasuja ja useita sektoreita (mukaan lukien maa- ja metsätalous) kattava 
strategia, jonka puitteissa toteutettaisiin monia erilaisia vähäpäästöisiä tekniikoita. Näitä ovat 
mm. negatiivisiin päästöihin johtavat tekniikat (esim. metsien hiilinielut ja hiiltä sitova bio-
massa). Ydinvoiman ja uusiutuvien energialähteiden katsotaan olevan tärkeitä tulevia keinoja 
tällä alueella ilmastonmuutoksen hillitsemiseksi. Tämä osoittaa, että nykyiset kansalliset poli-
tiikat Suomen kaltaisissa maissa voivat olla yhteensopivia vähäpäästöisen tulevaisuuden 
kanssa. 
Ilmastopolitiikan toteutus voi saada aikaan perustavia muutoksia maa- ja metsätalouden 
taloudellisissa rakenteissa. Erityisesti tämä koskee uusien markkinoiden ja liiketoiminta-
mahdollisuuksien luomista niiden lisätuottojen avulla, joita metsänistutus ja bioenergiaan 
liittyvä toiminta synnyttävät näillä aloilla. Ilmastonmuutosta hillitsevät politiikat, erityisesti 
tiukat kasvihuonekaasuja koskevat rajoitukset, voivat saada aikaan merkittäviä oheishyötyjä 
monien ilmansaasteiden, kuten mustan hiilen päästöjen kannalta, kun polttoaineissa ja tek-
niikoissa tapahtuu muutoksia. Tarvitaan kokonaisvaltaista politiikkaa, jonka avulla nämä 
mahdolliset edut voidaan saavuttaa täysimääräisesti. 
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A growing interest in the Arctic by both coastal and non-coastal states has evolved over the 
last decades. According to some estimates, the Arctic hosts up to 90 billion barrels of oil and 
approximately one-third of unexplored natural gas resources. The coastal states (Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Russia, and USA) have intensified attempts to extend their jurisdiction 
beyond the seabed outside of the exclusive economic zones that touch upon the interests of 
the three other countries of the Arctic Council (Finland, Iceland, and Sweden). There also is 
evidence of increasing interest in the Arctic by non-Arctic countries (e.g., the European 
Union, China). A primary objective for reducing negative anthropogenic impacts in the Arctic 
is improvements in the environmental management of the Arctic, specifically, preventing oil 
contamination in the Arctic Seas and adjoining lands, and combating transboundary air 
pollution, including stable organic pollutants. Special rules for the environmental protection of 
the Arctic have yet to be developed; the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea could, in this 
regard, serve as an overall framework.  
Currently, the Arctic is at a cross-road in terms of its future development. We seem to have 
two options – either broad international cooperation aiming at the co-evolution of humans 
and nature, sustainable development of the fragile Arctic ecosystem, and improvement of the 
life standards of numerous indigenous groups or a new “Cold War” in the region – juridical 
conflicts and increasing disputes for control and military presence. Which path we choose will 
define the future fate of this very complex, vulnerable and dynamic region. Albeit it is 
unlikely that the Arctic will be completely demilitarized, the recent agreement between Russia 
and Norway on the maritime delimitation line, which now divides a long disputed area of the 
Arctic Ocean, is a step in the right direction toward finding an international solution for the 
exploration of the vast oil and gas deposits in the Barents Sea, and for the elaboration of a 
new treaty on international governance of the Arctic.  
The impact of the climate on the Arctic plays a crucial role for Finland’s, as well as other 
Nordic countries’ current and future climatic conditions. Satellite observations reveal that the 
Arctic Sea ice extent has decreased since the end of the 1970s. The melting of ice in the 
Eurasian Arctic Seas is likely to open a shorter sea route between Europe, Asia, and the 
Pacific and to provide access to the Arctic’s potentially vast seabed resources, including oil, 
gas, minerals, and fishery. The Arctic shipping lanes may also become more accessible to 
trade and tourism. However, a large number of challenges may limit the development of 
future shipping operations in the Arctic area. These include governance of the sea lanes, lack 
of key infrastructure in the area, and harmonized Arctic vessel standards. According to the 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (Arctic Council, 2009), for example, most of the 
Arctic travel will continue to be destinational rather than trans-Arctic in 2020.  
However, estimations on the future pace and extent of ice melt diverge considerably between 
the generally established view presented by the IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report and 
that of independent research groups in Russia and elsewhere. The IPCC projections indicate 
that the ice melt will continue throughout the 21st century, and late summer sea ice is 
expected to virtually disappear completely toward the end of the projection period. However, 
alternative forecasts (e.g., that of the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Institute) predict a 
continuation (not trend) of the oscillatory character of the dynamics of the Arctic Sea ice 
area, attributable primarily to the regional specifics of climate cycles and long-period trends. 
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Regardless of which forecasts prove correct, in the coming decades sea ice will be present 
for much of the year and therefore access to the Arctic, such as the Northwest Passage and 
Northern Sea Route, will continue to be controlled by ice conditions in the future.  
The thawing of permafrost in the vast areas of Northern Eurasia could lead to a rapid 
increase in carbon emissions (particularly in the form of methane). This feedback could 
significantly accelerate warming in the Arctic and affect the Earth’s climate machine, resulting 
in additional emissions that are equal or greater than the current emissions attributable to 
deforestation in the tropics. Furthermore, the duration of the soil frost period will shorten 
toward the end of the 21st century. In central and northern Finland, the maximum annual soil 
frost depth will decrease, which may reduce but not eliminate the need to protect buildings 
and constructions, thus saving costs in the construction and transport sectors. On the other 
hand, reductions in soil frost could have negative impacts on the forestry sector, since 
harvesting becomes more difficult.  
The northern territories of the Eurasian continent and adjoining seas (particularly the western 
regions) are expected to experience considerable warming and an increase in precipitation 
throughout the 21st century. Yet climate change will affect these regions both positively and 
negatively. The direct impacts may, inter alia, include:  
 Negative impacts for and even threats to the existence of numerous biological 
species (polar bears, seals, walruses, northern deer and sea birds); 
 An increase in the number and severity of large forest fires and pandemic insect 
outbreaks, particularly in the eastern continental regions of Northern Asia; 
 The increasing variability of the climate will affect the vitality and productivity of 
terrestrial ecosystems. Summer droughts and winter thaws will have visible negative 
impacts on ecosystems. Warming will affect the heating regimes of lakes and the 
quality of the environment under the ice, which will likely decrease the productivity 
of aquatic ecosystems; 
 Marine ecosystems are also quite vulnerable. A rise in temperature and decrease in 
ice cover will result in a northward shift of the boundaries of distribution of different 
fish species. Climatic change may lead to an expansion of exotic species, the 
acceleration of competition, increasing eutrophication and contamination. More 
favorable conditions are expected for some regions of the Arctic, which will bring a 
rise in the productivity of forage reserves, expansion of the area of population of 
certain fish species, intensification of fishing, and the migration of valuable 
commercial species; 
 The reduction of the ice cover will improve access to the Arctic shelves. However, the 
predicted climate change in the Arctic will not decrease dangerous hydro-
meteorological impacts, but instead redistribute these (an increase in the probability 
of high wind waves, movement of drift ice in new regions, etc.); 
 It is very likely that the number and severity of dangerous climatic events will 
increase (strong winds, snowstorms, ice conditions of roads, decreasing ice 
conditions in seas, etc.); 
 The impacts on the Arctic coastal area throughout the 21st century will include an 
acceleration in sea level rise (by 0.18—0.59 m, (IPCC 2007)), further increase in sea 
surface temperature, more extreme weather events and storm surges, altered 
precipitation and ocean acidification; 
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 Impacts will affect tourism, conditions for life and the health of the population, 
particularly the residents of high latitudes; 
 Demand for heating may decrease and be to some extent replaced by the demand 
for cooling. Increased climate variability will encumber the achievement of long-term 
strategies based on the overall warming trend and the potential benefits these could 
bring. 
On the whole, the expected climate change will have more favorable effects on the territories 
of the Nordic countries (particularly Finland) than on other regions of Northern Eurasia. 
These may, inter alia, include: 
 The increase in annual precipitation will benefit hydro-power production. However, 
more frequent and dangerous floods and, in general, higher water flow is expected, 
which will affect civil engineering constructions; 
 Climate change will open new opportunities for Finnish agriculture. A warmer climate 
will extend the thermal growing season and rate of physiological processes. This will 
allow for a substantial expansion of cultivable areas to include commonly grown 
major and minor crops, as well as for an increase in the yield of major field crops. 
The cultivation of new species will also become possible. The realization of high yield 
potential will require special adaptation measures; 
 The growth and productivity of forests will accelerate. Climate change and proper 
forest management could increase the amount of carbon in Finnish forests by up to 
one-third. The growing conditions will be more favorable, particularly for deciduous 
trees. However, forest damage caused by insects is expected to spread further 
northward. Winter heat spells may prompt unfavorable physiological effects. Timber 
felling conditions will become more hazardous. The forest fire potential is expected to 
increase by the end of this century, especially in southern Finland.  
 By 2020, the traffic volumes on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) are expected to 
increase from 1.5 to 40 million tons per year. The higher traffic volumes will lower 
the operating charges, which at present are relatively high on the NSR.  
A number of social and economic problems may evolve from global change in other parts of 
the world, where the negative impacts of climate change will become clearly visible. These 
relate to uncontrolled emigration, impoverishment of the environment and a decrease in the 
production of energy resources and raw materials, which are also of economic significance 
for Finland. 
Future socioeconomic developments in the Arctic region will depend on the effectiveness of 
state policies and on adaptation and mitigation programs. It is very likely that these will differ 
considerably in the Nordic countries and Russia. In Finland, sustainable development policies 
and programs are well developed and successfully being implemented1. This allows for the 
assumption that the country’s socioeconomic development will not be significantly impacted 
by climate change over the next two to three decades. However, considerable uncertainty in 
climatic predictions requires further intensification of harmonization strategies in order to 
minimize the risks and losses related to inconsistent and often contradictory climatic 
scenarios. 
                                               
1  National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change, 2005; National Strategy for Sustainable 
Development, 2006; Finland’s Development Policy Program, 2007; A National Climate and Energy 
Strategy, 2008; National Resources Strategy, 2009. 
  16 
Reductions in the atmospheric burden of CO2 should form the basis of any meaningful effort 
to mitigate climate forcing. Yet even if swift and profound reductions of CO2 are made, the 
rapid melting in the Arctic (as projected by the IPCC) will not necessarily be delayed, owing 
to the long lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere. However, shorter-lived climate forcing agents 
(SLCF) than CO2 exist, including black carbon aerosol (BC, a solid particle emitted from 
incomplete combustion, commonly known as “soot”), tropospheric ozone, and methane 
(CH4). Due to a shorter residence time in the atmosphere than CO2, reductions in the 
concentrations of SLCF’s would be felt much sooner than a decrease in long-lived greenhouse 
gases.  
The implications of BC reduction are stronger in the Arctic than elsewhere, because 
atmospheric absorption is enhanced by the high albedo of snow and ice surfaces, which, in 
turn, are reduced by BC deposition. When considering Europe only, Arctic pollution levels are 
most sensitive to emissions from the northern-most European countries, with Norway ranking 
first, followed by Finland and Sweden. Reducing BC emissions may provide a means to slow 
down Arctic warming, to curb the length of the melting season, and limit the feedback 
effects.  
The use of diesel fuel, open burning (both agricultural burning and wildfires), and residential 
combustion of solid fuels (including biomass) account for the majority of BC that reaches the 
Arctic. Potentially large amounts of emissions (yet poorly quantified to date) result from the 
exploration of oil and gas in the northern latitudes. 
The sectors in Finland with the highest BC emission intensities include the transport sector 
(road and off-road) and domestic combustion (primarily wood burning). None of the existing 
laws specifically targets the reduction of BC, although its reduction has been considered by a 
number of policy initiatives (Arctic Council, UNECE, UNEP). However, since BC is co-emitted 
with pollutants that are controlled by current legislation, a reduction in emissions by a 
number of sectors is expected in most of the Arctic countries, including Finland. 
A comparison of emissions from all Arctic Council nations reveals that Finland only 
contributes a few percent of total emissions that impact the Arctic, and can therefore 
obviously not bring about marked reductions in emissions or forcing on its own. Consolidated 
international action, e.g., ongoing activities under the umbrella of the Arctic Council, is 
therefore necessary. The national emission structure varies from country to country and, 
consequently, a consolidated abatement strategy will have to take these differences into 
account. Finally, the rate of emissions into the Arctic by international shipping could 
significantly increase, should the ice melting scenarios materialize. This, in turn, would 
necessitate the development of a strategy to limit such emissions from Arctic shipping.  
Russia is a major trading partner of Finland for energy sources, certain metals, and round 
wood. The expected climate change in the Russian polar and boreal regions will impact the 
environment and production of exported industrial goods in different ways. Climate change in 
general, and winter warming in particular, will facilitate production processes. However, the 
thawing of permafrost will, inter alia, complicate the development of infrastructure, 
specifically of product pipelines and roads, and increase the frequency of accidents and the 
maintenance costs for existing infrastructure, and finally, raise the price of exports.  
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Russia faces a number of substantial socioeconomic problems which hamper the sustainable 
development of the Russian Arctic and thus reinforces the negative consequences of climate 
change. Russia’s most pressing problems, inter alia, include: (1) increasing lag in the 
socioeconomic development of its northern regions; (2) demographic decline (high death 
rate, low birth rate, emigration of population, ageing, etc.); (3) obsolescence of transport 
infrastructure; (4) lack of new competitive and ecologically clean industrial technologies; (5) 
decrease in the exploration of minerals stocks; (6) decline in the traditional economies of 
indigenous nations; and (7) substantial deterioration in the generation of information and 
scientific knowledge in the region. Climate change will aggravate these negative trends if the 
national policy in the Arctic is not immediately modified. Recent decisions by the Russian 
Government indicate that Russia plans to tackle the most urgent infrastructure problems in 
the Russian Arctic. However, in order to do so successfully, major investments and 
substantial international involvement will be necessary. 
It is assumed that demand in Finland for Russian wood will not substantially decrease over 
the next two to three decades. The impacts of climate change on Russian forests will differ in 
North-West Russia (where the majority of current and future wood exports to Finland 
originate from) and in the Asian boreal region. Both of these regions have vast forest 
resources. On average, the climate change in the European North is expected to be similar to 
that in the Baltic countries. The major problems faced by the forest industry in this region 
include the lack of intensive forest management, the extremely weak infrastructure, and the 
obsolete machinery and technologies. Thus, future developments in the forest sector and its 
export potential will largely depend on Russia’s future economic and social policies, which 
continue to lag behind. The climate change impacts on Siberian forests are more dramatic. 
Severe natural disturbance events, particularly fire and insect outbreaks, pose a real threat to 
the forests’ survival. The infrastructure problem is more acute in Siberia than in the European 
North. However, the opening of the Arctic Sea route would establish a valuable transport 
passage to Northern Europe for the many diverse goods Siberia’s “storage room” has to 
offer. The challenges that could make the utilization of Arctic shipping lanes unfeasible 
include, e.g., high insurance premiums, lack of infrastructure, harsh conditions, problems 
with drift ice and icebergs, as well as the shallow depths of some of the passages. The 
development of future Arctic maritime operations faces a number of additional obstacles 
related, in particular, to issues of governance and infrastructure. These include questions 
about the legal status of Arctic shipping lanes, the lack of binding and harmonized polar 
vessel construction standards, the limitations to radio and satellite coverage in the region, 
and open questions about the monitoring and controlling of the movements of ships in the 
Arctic.  
Future global socioeconomic uncertainty will play a significant role in determining the 
geopolitics of energy trade, especially for major energy exporters like Russia. Current 
estimates on unconventional and new resources (including newly discovered Arctic oil and 
gas) indicate that concerns about economic recoverability and the environment are more 
likely to initiate a shift among energy importers (like Finland) to other sources of energy in 
the future than a severe limitation of resources. 
Fossil fuel prices are likely to increase due to the rise in energy demand and the progressive 
depletion of low-cost fossil resources, especially in conjunction with ever-more stringent 
climate constraints. However, in the absence of technological innovations that can lower the 
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costs of the currently expensive fossil fuel alternatives, the impacts on exporting economies 
like Russia will not be significant. 
In order to achieve climate stabilization, the rate of decarbonization would have to increase 
rapidly and a multi-gas, multi-sector strategy (including agriculture and forestry) involving 
the implementation of a range of low GHG technologies, including negative emissions 
technologies (like forest sinks and biomass with carbon capture), would have to be 
implemented. Electricity from nuclear power and renewable resources are seen to play a 
major role in this region in the future in mitigating climate change, thus indicating that 
current national policies in countries like Finland can be compatible with low climate futures. 
The implementation of climate policies could bring about fundamental changes in the 
economics of the agriculture and forestry sectors. This concerns, in particular, the 
establishment of new markets and business opportunities through additional revenues from 
afforestation and bioenergy activities within these sectors. Climate mitigation policies, 
especially stringent GHG reductions, can generate significant co-benefits for many air 
pollutants like BC emissions through shifts in fuels and technologies. This indicates the need 
for integrated policies that can fully realize these potential benefits. 
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2 INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this review is to analyze “what is currently known about the effects of 
climate change and likely climate abatement policies on the accessibility and value of natural 
resources in Northern Europe in the Arctic Sea area, on the one hand, and on the logistical 
position of Northern Europe, on the other hand” with a special emphasis on Finland. 
The Arctic is an enormous area around the North Pole that covers over one-sixth of the 
Earth’s landmass. The Arctic region has a number of definitions. In this analysis, we mostly 
limit the definition to that part of the Arctic Ocean located across Northern Eurasia, to the 
high latitude territories (to approx. 50o North) of the Northern Eurasian continent or to the 
Arctic nations including Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and 
the United States.  
Far-reaching and multi-faceted changes are taking place in the Arctic, which have profound 
consequences for the region’s economic and political significance in international relations. 
This is compounded by the lack of applicability of a clear and comprehensive legal regime in 
the region. The applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is not 
clearly defined (see Box 1). The five Arctic littoral states (Russia, Canada, the United States, 
Norway, and Denmark) are now seeking to increase their sphere of commercial activity by 
roving through seabed surveys eager to stumble upon a clause that stipulates that a specific 
area of the Arctic geographically belongs to their continental shelf. Other countries like China 
and Japan are also showing real interest in the region. This, in turn, has already led to the 
emergence of competing claims over sovereignty and to increasing military presence. Two 
nuclear powers – the United States and the Russian Federation – converge on the Arctic with 
competing claims and activities. 
Today, the region is already a host to many environmental problems, including radiation from 
nuclear fallout and other dangerous pollutants that affect the flora and fauna of the region, 
sea life, birds, marine mammals, and their habitats. The population of the Arctic, which 
includes over 30 different indigenous nations, is at the mercy of ongoing and expected 
changes which may be global in scope, but are local in their manifestation.  
Recent climate change has also had substantial influence on the region’s natural environment 
which, in turn, has triggered new environmental impacts around the world. The climate 
change that has taken place in the Eurasian Arctic during the last decades has been 
dramatic. The rate of warming in the Eurasian Arctic is nearly twice as high as that of global 
warming. Research suggests that further major changes in the Arctic’s environment and 
ecosystem – including melting ice and thawing permafrost – are to be expected. It is very 
likely that these changes will bring with them a number of serious regional and global 
consequences. 
The impact of these future changes in the Arctic region will be of particular significance for 
countries like Finland. According to the IPCC and other national assessments, Finland will – 
depending on the respective emission scenario – experience a temperature increase of 
between 3 to 7 degrees, and a 13–30% increase in average annual precipitation. The 
temperature and precipitation changes are projected to be more pronounced during winter. 
Alternatively, the amount of mid-winter snow is expected to decrease by 30 to 60%. The 
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occurrence of extreme weather events, e.g., heavy rain and subsequent floods, as well as 
heat waves will increase. Climate change will directly and indirectly affect the country’s 
economy and human well-being. However, because we live in an increasingly interdependent 
world, Finland is largely dependent on its economic interactions with the rest of the world 
and, consequently, global change in other regions, particularly in Northern Eurasia, also 
affects Finland.  
Although Finland does not have a coastline on the Arctic Ocean, the ongoing and expected 
climate change in the Arctic is likely to generate significant ramifications for the country’s 
economy and population on account of: 
 the region’s high political profile and geopolitical position, which may lead to an 
acceleration of the race for energy rights and other natural resources of the Arctic, 
thus also increasing the likelihood of disputes over the rights of these resources, 
which may entail a number of security and military implications; 
 the decreasing ice and warming temperature may unlock the Arctic seabed’s natural 
resources and reveal new ones, in particular oil and gas deposits; 
 the shrinking of the ice-cap and reduction in the area of sea ice may open new 
transport corridors in the Arctic Seas; 
 the impacts of change in the Arctic on countries that have close economic relations 
with Finland (particularly Russia).  
Given the considerable uncertainties of future climate change, it is important for all countries 
(in particular for Finland as a reputable global leader on climate change policy) to develop a 
long-term climate abatement policy that can mitigate some of the effects of climate change 
and hedge against some of its uncertainty. Developing robust energy systems in the face of 
uncertain climatic change will be crucial for an energy importing economy like Finland. 
This report addresses some aspects of the problem, which is being researched at the 
International Institute for Applied System Analysis. The key issues dealt with in this report 
include: 
1. An analysis of current and expected climate change in the Arctic with a special 
emphasis on Northern Eurasia. Coupled Atmosphere-Ocean Global Circulation Models 
(AOGCM), which IPCC forecasts are based on, indicate that severe warming will take 
place during the 21st century with catastrophic consequences for the Arctic 
ecosystem. However, these predictions are subject to considerable uncertainty, and 
AOGCMs do not necessarily reflect all regional and local details, particularly when it 
comes to such a distinctive region like the Arctic. To better elucidate this uncertainty, 
we have also included a discussion of studies that present an alternative point of 
view on the timing and probability of such climatic change;  
2. Impacts of climate change on (1) transport availability in the Arctic, and (2) the 
production and delivery potentials of raw materials in Russia as one of Finland’s 
major trading partners; 
3. Climate abatement policies in the face of socioeconomic uncertainty and their 
potential impacts on the development of future energy systems; 
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4. Short-lived climate forcers, particularly black carbon, and their role in supplementing 
the activities to control CO2 and other greenhouse gases in order to slow down Arctic 
warming. Within this context, we will also discuss Finland’s current and future black 
carbon emission rate. 
Box 1  The International Legal and Political Framework for the Arctic (adapted from 
Jakobson, 2010)  
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)  
Opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982; entered into force on 16 
November 1994; 160 parties as of 1 January 2010; depositary UN Secretary-General. The Convention 
aims to regulate all aspects of the resources of the sea and uses of the ocean. According to UNCLOS, 
coastal (littoral) states have undisputed sovereign rights to their territorial sea and exclusive economic 
zone, which extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers) from their coastal baseline 
(Articles 3 and 57). Finland is not a littoral state of the Arctic Ocean. Treaty text: United Nations Treaty 
Series, Vol. 1833 (1994)  
The Arctic Council  
Established by the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration), 19 
September 1996; inaugurated 17 September 1998; 8 member states, 6 non-Arctic observer states and 
3 ad hoc non-Arctic observer states. The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum that aims to 
promote cooperation among the Arctic states, in particular on issues of sustainable development and 
environmental protection. It is not an international organization with a solid legal charter, but rather an 
international forum designed to foster cooperation and collaboration on Arctic issues. Only Arctic 
Council member states have voting rights. Website: http://arctic-council.org/ 
 
International Maritime Organization Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered 
Waters  
Approved October and December 2002; issued 23 December 2002. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) Guidelines focus on the special climatic conditions of the Arctic and aim to promote 
the safety of navigation and prevention of pollution from shipping operations in the Arctic. The 
Guidelines are not legally binding. Text: International Maritime Organization, MSC/Circ.1056 and 
MEPC/Circ.399, 23 December 2002, http://www.imo.org/safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1787   
 
Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen (Svalbard Treaty)  
Signed by the 9 original parties at Paris, France, on 9 February 1920; entered into force on 14 August 
1925; 40 parties as of 1 January 2010; depositary French Government. The treaty establishes Norway’s 
full sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago, but stipulates that it must remain demilitarized. Citizens 
from all states which are party to the Treaty enjoy equal right of access to and residence rights in 
Svalbard. Treaty text: League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2 (1920). 
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Figure (introduction). Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Boundaries Research Unit, 2008. 
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3 ONGOING AND ANTICIPATED CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE          
EURASIAN ARCTIC 
3.1 Observations of past and ongoing climate change 
The climate of the Arctic has undergone rapid and dramatic change (IPCC, 2007, ACIA, 
2005). Past climate change is characterized by regular and longer climatic cycles on decade-
to-century time scales and was most likely caused by oceanic and atmospheric variability and 
variations in solar intensity. In the 1940s, the Arctic experienced a warming period. 
Nonetheless, the IPCC asserts that most of the global warming observed over the last 
decades is attributable to human activities (IPCC, 2007). 
A distinct feature of climatic change in North Eurasia during the second half of the 20th 
century was the significant increase in temperature: The estimated warming trend is above 
0.2 ˚C/10 years and up to 0.5oC /10 years in some “hot spot” regions of the continent; these 
hot spots are mostly found in eastern Siberia. The process is spatially heterogeneous: 
Maximal warming takes place in continental regions, and to a lesser extent in the maritime 
regions of the Arctic coast (Gavrilova, 2007; Onuchin & Burenina, 2008). The average 
warming in high latitudes was 1.5-fold higher than in southern Siberia and 3-fold higher than 
in Mongolia. The rate of warming is highest in central Siberia: Over the last century, the 
winter temperature increased by 10 ˚С in Jakutia, 7 ˚С in Pribaikalie, and 5 ˚С in Mongolia, 
with an increase in the annual average temperature of 2 to 3.5 ˚С. The growth period 
throughout the region (with a daily temperature of > 5 ˚С) increased by 1 to 2 weeks, more 
so in the south than in the north, and less so in more humid than in dry climates. The 
intensity of warming since the 1970s is 1.5 to 2 times higher as compared with that of the 
first half of the 20th century (Table 1). 
Table 1  Linear trend in temperature (˚C/100 year) for the Northern Eurasia regions 
(1976–2002).   
Region Year Winter Spring Summer Autumn 
Western Siberia 3.7 6.8 8.5 1.2 -1.3 
Central Siberia 5.3 7.3 7.7 5.9 0.5 
Baikal Region 6.3 8.3 9.5 7.5 0.2 
North-East of Asian Russia 4.4 -0.8 8.2 4.4 5.5 
Russian Federation 4.9 6.7 7.1 4.6 1.6 
Source: Gruza et al., 2002. 
Observations of Arctic precipitation are restricted to a limited network of stations and are 
often unreliable since winter snowfall cannot be accurately measured due to drifting snow. 
On the whole, trends in annual and seasonal precipitation differed by season: A positive 
precipitation trend was observed in winter (2 to 5 mm/10 years) and a negative one in 
summer (2 to -7 mm/10 years). The annual amount of precipitation in northern Europe and 
western Siberia has increased significantly. A tendency toward a decrease in precipitation 
was observed in continental regions of central and eastern Siberia (e.g., -4.1mm/100 years 
for the area around the Lake Baikal). The increasing aridity of the climate is characteristic of 
practically all of continental northern Asia.  
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One of the integral climatic indicators often used to identify possible water stress in plants 
(or lack thereof) is the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) (Palmer, 1965). Negative PDSI 
values signify prolonged drought, while values greater than zero reflect normal or wet spell 
conditions. An evaluation of empirical orthogonal functions of this index reveals that most 
changes since 1950 in the PDSI for Siberia can be explained by linear trends toward drier 
conditions. The index has increased toward wetter conditions in Scandinavia and northern 
European Russia (but only slightly in southern regions) (Dai et al., 2004, Lapenis et al., 
2005). 
Permafrost covers almost two-thirds (65.5%) of the northern Eurasian territory. Continuous 
permafrost occupies 40% of the territory, whereas discontinuous and island permafrost 
occupy 11.4 and 14.1% of the area, respectively (Melnikov & Pavlov, 2006). The high 
vulnerability of frozen quaternary deposits is attributable to their low temperature (up to  
-16 ˚C on the Arctic shoreline) and large ice content in the form of ice inclusions and ice 
below ground. Geothermic and cryogenic conditions have resulted in the development of 
dangerous cryogenic geologic processes and the destruction of infrastructure in high latitudes 
east of Finland. 
An intrinsic feature of ongoing climate change is the high degree of regional heterogeneity of 
high latitude climate in two dimensions: The 100 year rate and cycling. Melnikov and Pavlov 
(2006) found that continental Russia in particular experienced a significant climate change  
(> 1 ˚C) in the 20th century, (1.4 to 2.1 ˚C for approximately 50% of its territory), while 1/5 
and 1/3 of the territory experienced moderate (0.8 to 1.0 ˚C) and weak (<0.8 ˚C) climate 
change, respectively. The highest rate of climate change was evident south of Siberia  
(0.008 ˚C /year), the lowest rate was recorded in northern Europe and the plains of East 
Siberia (0.002 ˚C /year). 
The growing season of high-latitude terrestrial ecosystems increased by 12 days during the 
years 1981–1991 (Myneni et al., 1997). A positive feedback between spring snow-cover 
disappearance and radiative balance can result in warmer spring air temperatures. This is 
likely to exacerbate the continued early thaw and onset of the growing season, resulting in 
further modifications in productivity and net C uptake (McGuire et al., 2001). Even minor 
changes in global temperatures could result in imbalanced responses in Arctic and boreal 
regions, with positive feedbacks that could enhance certain processes, such as 
photosynthesis and respiration. 
Winter has become shorter by between 8–13 days (Romashova, 2004). Furthermore, warm 
winters occur 2–2.8 times more frequently than they used to. These trends have changed the 
relationship between heat and humidity, which defines the dynamics of important ecosystem 
processes and the functioning of natural systems. The recurrence of strong winds (>15 m 
sec-1) has increased by 3–13 times in recent decades (Romashova, 2004). The increase in 
snow depth in some regions (e.g., in East Siberia) has shifted to the south. The runoff of 
large Siberian rivers has also increased. Despite the substantial spatial heterogeneity of 
climate change throughout the region, the increase in temperature in large parts of 
continental North Eurasia was not compensated for by the change in precipitation. It has lead 
to increased aridity of climates, particularly in the continental regions. 
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Observations and climate models indicate that present-day changes in radiation forcing affect 
surface heat, moisture budgets, and hydrological regimes of large territories. Permafrost and 
seasonally frozen ground have brought about significant changes in most regions (especially 
in high latitudes) in recent decades. Between the 1960s and 1990s, the permafrost 
temperature in East Siberia increased by approximately 1˚C at a depth of 1.6–3.2 m, and by 
0.3 ˚C to 0.7 ˚C at a depth of 10 m in northwestern Siberia. Long-term monitoring of the 
depth of the active layer of permafrost reveals a statistically significant increase by 
approximately 21 cm between 1956 and 1990. The results of permafrost monitoring from 
1989 to 2002 published by the Institute of Cryolitozone (Yakutsk) indicate that, under 
present-day warming trends, a rapid degradation of the upper part of ice-rich soils of both 
undisturbed and disturbed permafrost landscapes is taking place, with a 5–30% loss in 
ground ice, and a particularly severe degradation of disturbed sites (Gavriliev, 2003). 
Some uncertainties of climate change predictions in the Arctic are generated by the sparse 
network of meteorological stations (currently, only about 80 meteorological stations that 
provide data on a relatively long period of observation work in the Russian high latitudes), 
which are predominantly located in plains and outside of forests.  
3.2 Prediction of future climate 
Climate change predictions are usually based on coupled atmospheric-ocean global 
circulation models (AOGCM). These models (derived from physical laws) provide a physically 
consistent picture of future climate change in contrast to all other available methods used to 
forecast future climate. The AOGCMs currently being used offer the maximum level of 
knowledge we have today on possible future climate change scenarios. At present, there are 
only few available alternatives to scientifically project climate change. 
Several projections of the Arctic climate have been presented. ACIA (2005) used five 
different global climate models (CGCM2, Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis; 
CSM_1.4, National Center for Atmospheric Research, United States; CHAM4/ OPYC3, Max 
Planck Institute for Meteorology, Germany; GFDL-R30_c, Geophysical Fluid Dynamics 
Laboratory, United States; and HadCM3, Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research, 
United Kingdom) coupled with two different emissions (GHG and aerosol) scenarios (B2 and 
A2). Other assessments are based on HadCM3, CSIRO, NCAR-PCM, ECHAM4, CGCM2, GFDL 
and CCSR NIES by large regions (of which four cover the Northern Hemisphere’s Arctic and 
boreal regions within the framework of the IPCC Scenarios A1F1 (fossil intensive), A2, B2, 
B1, in descending order, of radiative forcing by 2100). The divergence between the 
projection results of the individual models is quite high (Table 2) -temperature and 
precipitation deviate by a factor of 10 (the maximum increase in temperature lies at  
16–18 ˚C during certain periods according to the CCSR NIES model and precipitation could 
increase by up to 100% according to the ECHAM4 model). 
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Table 2  Projection of changes in temperature and precipitation in high latitudes for the 
21st century based on different AOGCMs. 
December-February March-May June-August September-November Period 
ΔT, oC ΔP, %% ΔT, oC ΔP, %% ΔT, oC ΔP, %% ΔT, oC ΔP, %% 
Arctic Land (67.5 S Lat, 90 N Lat) 
2010–2039 +1.6; +3.6 +4; +24 +1.3; +3.0 +2; +19 +0.7; +3.0 +3; +16 +2.1; +4.7 +2; +17 
2040–2069 +2.7; +8.7 +6; +55 +2.1; +5.6 +7; +37 +0.9; +5.5 +6; +32 +2.6; +9.3 +5; +40 
2970–2099 +5.0; +18 +9; +81 +3.0; +11 +10; +62 +1.0; +8.0 +5; +51 +3.8; +14 +9; +62 
Northern Asia (50.0 S Lat, 67.5 N Lat, 40.0 W Lon, -170.0 E Lon) 
2010–2039 +0.9; +5.5 +3; +36 +0.7; +3.8 +3; +17 +0.7; +2.9 +1; +10 +1.0; +3.9 +3; +16 
2040–2069 +1.8; +9.6 +7; +70 +1.2; +6.5 +9; +39 +1.1; +5.2 +1; +15 +1.9; +7.1 +5; +20 
2970–2099 +3.0; +16 +9; +105 +2.0; +13 +10; +71 +1.6; +9.1 +3; +28 +2.1; +12 +9; +31 
Northern Europe (47.5 S Lat, 67.5 N Lat, -0.10.0 W Lat, 40.0 E Lon) 
2010–2039 +1.0;+4.1 +2; +22 +1.0;+3.0 -2; +16 +0.6; +2.2 -5; +8 +0.9; +3.0 -4; +12 
2040–2069 +1.8; +8.5 +1; +41 +1.0; +7.0 +1; +28 +1.0; +3.9 -10; +15 +1.7; +5.9 -1; +16 
2070–2099 +2.2; 13.9 +6; +60 +1.8; 11.2 +5; +49 +1.2; +6.2 -21; +18 +1.9; +9.0 0; +21 
Source: Ruosteenoja et al., 2003. 
The divergence in the projections for each region is very high. However, some common 
trends emerge for all high latitude regions of North Eurasia, namely:  
 by the end of the 21st century, an increase in average annual temperature by 
approx. 4 ˚C is anticipated for 60–90o NL, and by >5 ˚C for the central Arctic; 
 the maximum increase in temperature is predicted mostly for cold months (December 
to February); the average increase by the end of the century is expected to be 
around 10 ˚C; maximal summer warming is limited to 1 ˚C for the major part of the 
Arctic; 
 by 2100, a minimal increase in temperature by approx. 6 ˚C is expected for spring 
and summer (March to August); 
 considerable increases in precipitation are expected; however, the projections differ 
considerably – precipitation over the Atlantic sector of the Arctic could increase by 5 
to 10% between 2071–2090, and by up to 35% in other regions, mainly in the winter 
and fall, and a minimum increase is projected in the summer; 
 an increase in precipitation is expected, primarily during winter; 
 an increase in climate aridity is projected for the southern continental regions; 
 an increase in river discharge by 11.1% on average is anticipated between 2071–
2090, but only by 3.2% between 2011–2030; 
 shrinking ice cover with a very high variability – e.g., between 9 and 16 million km2 
by the end of March (the average by the end of March at the close of the 20th 
century was approx. 14 million km2); 
 no definite conclusion on changes with regard to extreme events; 
 Scenarios A2 and B2 only differ significantly after the 2050s. 
Decreasing the precipitation in continental areas of the Asian high latitudes could turn out to 
be critical for terrestrial ecosystems. Table 3 presents projections of changes in temperature 
and precipitation based on 16 coupled AOGCMs, using the IPCC Scenario A2 for Asian Russia 
(Meleshko et al., 2008). The anticipated changes are compared to the base climate period of 
1980–1999.  
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Table 3  Projection of changes in temperature and precipitation in the 21st century in 
Asian Russia, based on 16 coupled AOGCMs. 
2011–2030 2041–2060 2080–2099 Region 
Winter Summer Winter Summer Winter Summer 
Surface temperature (˚C) 
West Siberia 1.4±0.7 0.8±0.5 3.4±1.0 2.0±0.8 7.2±1.8 4.4±1.4 
East Siberia 1.5±0.6 0.8±0.4 3.6±1.0 1.7±0.7 7.7±1.7 3.9±1.4 
All of Russian 
territory  
1.4±0.7 0.8±0.4 3.4±0.8 1.9±0.7 7.2±1.7 4.2±1.3 
Precipitation (change in % to current climate) 
West Siberia 7±4 1±1 16±8 4±3 39±11 7±6 
East Siberia 10±3 3±3 19±7 6±4 45±14 14±7 
All of Russian 
territory  
6±3 2±1 14±5 4±3 34±8 8±5 
Source: Meleshko et al., 2008. 
Modeling studies on permafrost behavior in the 21st century predict a decrease in the total 
area of permafrost by 10–18%, 15–30%, and 20–35% by 2030, 2050 and 2080, respectively 
(Anisimov et al., 2003). Widespread thermokarst development, gully formation, landslides, 
solifluction, floods, paludification (or aridity, depending on geographical distribution and 
landscape peculiarities) are expected for large areas, especially those with ice-rich soils 
(which cover approximately 35% of Yakutia and 35–40% of northeastern parts of Russia). 
According to projections by the Institute of Cryolitozone in Yakutsk, the number of lakes and 
swamps may increase (by 1.3–3 times, presuming a future moderate warming of +3 ˚C) at 
different rates in different regions of northern Asia. If the observed warming trend Δt0  
≥ 0.06–0.09 ˚C yr-1 continues, unprecedented changes in the geocryological and ecological 
conditions and landscape are very likely in high latitudes of North Eurasia (Ivanov & 
Maximov, 2003).  
The warming will likely trigger an explosive rise in emissions of carbon stored in permafrost, 
wetlands and territories (a total amount of 500–700 Pg) (e.g., Desjatkin & Desjatkin, 2007). 
According to a study by Zimov et al. (2006), the total amount of carbon in the Siberian 
ground is estimated at around 1000 Pg C, including approx.500 Pg C in yedoma and 400 Pg 
C in non-yedoma permafrost, and 50 to 70 Pg C in the peatlands of West Siberia. 
Recently, Khvorstyanov et al. (2008a, 2008b), using a new model within the SRES-A2 
transient climate warming scenario of the IPSL CM4 climate model, found that the carbon-
rich Pleistocene soil could emit 256 kg C m-2 into the atmosphere, including 20 kg C m-2 
released as methane, from the East Siberia yedoma areas alone. 
Changes in the intensity of river runoff and its seasonal redistribution are also evident 
(Shiklomanov & Georgievsky, 2007), a tendency that will accelerate during the 21st century 
(Meleshko et al., 2008). 
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Figure 1  Dynamics of permafrost (1980–2000 and 2080–2100). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Romanovsky et al., 2001. 
3.3 Permafrost and soil frost in Finland 
Palsa mires are a feature of permafrost in Finland. Palsa mires are subarctic mire complexes 
with permanently frozen peat hummocks (Fronzek et al., 2009). They occur in high latitude 
environments in parts of Fennoscandia, Russia, Canada, and Alaska where they are a 
characteristic and unique feature of nature (Fronzek et al., 2009). According to Fronzek et al. 
(2009), Palsas are very sensitive to climatic conditions and have been decreasing throughout 
their distribution range in the Northern Hemisphere. This trend can be expected to continue 
with further changes in the climate. Palsas are one of the 65 priority natural habitat types 
listed in Annex I of the “Habitats” Directive of the European Union (Fronzek et al., 2009). 
Climate change has induced changes in soil frost conditions. According to Venalainen et al. 
(2001a, 2001b), the duration of the soil frost period will shorten by the end of the century in 
all countries. In central and northern Finland, the maximum annual soil frost depth will 
decrease. Decreasing soil frost may reduce the needs for protecting buildings and 
constructions, which would save costs in the construction and transport sectors (Mattila et 
al., 2005). Reductions in soil frost may have negative consequences for the forestry sector, 
which implies that harvesting would become more difficult. Soil frost also protects the roots 
of trees from damages by harvesting machinery and improves the anchoring of trees in the 
ground, thus reducing storm damages (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Finland, 2005). 
The decrease in snow cover in southern Finland increases the probability of frozen grounds in 
the middle of winter.  
In any case, it seems that soil frost will continue to exist in all parts of Finland, despite 
climate change, but the significant annual variation in soil frost conditions will nonetheless 
result in the need for soil frost protection. The decreasing soil frost due to climate change 
may also have some negative effects for forestry. 
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3.4 Uncertainties of climate predictions 
The question how realistic predictions of the future climate in the Arctic are, is quite 
significant: Profound uncertainties with reference to the observational data and climatic 
models exist (e.g., Kondratiev, 2004). As implied by ACIA (2005) and IPCC AR4, our 
understanding of the polar climate system continues to be incomplete due to (1) its complex 
interactions between and within the atmosphere-land-cryosphere-ocean-ecosystem, involving 
a variety of distinctive feedbacks; (2) several important systems features, which are not 
adequately represented in the models (clouds, boundary layer processes, sea ice, etc.); (3) 
the high variability of the climate on the annual and decadal time scale; (4) the diversity of 
natural atmospheric patterns like the NAM, the NAO, the PDO (Pacific Decadal Oscillation), 
etc., and (5) the inconsistency in the results of regional and global climatic models, the low 
resolution of global models, the scarce number of observations and limited knowledge of the 
developing processes in polar regions also contribute considerably to the high degree of 
uncertainty. 
Many scientists and institutions assert that the recent climate change in polar regions has 
natural drivers (Gudkovich et al., 2003, Konratiev, 2004, Frolov, 2006). They argue that (1) 
despite the exponential increase in GHG concentration, no substantial increase in air 
temperature and reduction of ice cover was observed during the 20th century; (2) the change 
in air temperature and in the area of ice cover was cyclic during the 20th century (the most 
important cycle lasted 50–60 years and its impact on inter-annual dispersion makes up more 
than 30% of the change); (3) the current hydro-thermodynamic models do not account for 
these cycles, nor for past climate change; (4) some research claims that the decreasing 
thickness of Arctic ice is a dynamic, but not a thermo-dynamic phenomenon caused by 
anthropogenic warming (Gudkovich et al., 2002); (5) the verification of the models does not 
usually include natural cycling, and (6) the models used do not take account of climate 
carbon cycle-feedback (IPCC, 2007). Based on the recognized 60-year cycle, scientists of the 
Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (St. Petersburg) predict that the conditions of the 
Arctic Seas by the middle of this century will be similar to those in the mid-1970s (thus 
decreasing the anomaly of the air temperature in the Arctic by -0.5 ˚C, increasing the ice 
cover area of the northern seas up to 1.2 M km2, as well as that of the seas of the Siberian 
Arctic shelf to 1.6 M km2 (Gudkovich et al., 2002). In order to present a complete picture, we 
have also included a short description of an alternative view of the future climate in the 
Arctic. 
3.5 Arctic Sea Ice in a changing climate 
Satellite observations reveal that the Arctic Sea ice extent has decreased since the end of the 
1970s (IPCC, 2007). The melting of the Arctic Sea ice has raised increasing interest not only 
among the Arctic Council nations, but also among nations close or outside of the Arctic area 
(Jakobson, 2010). The melting of sea ice provides possibilities to, inter alia, exploit the 
Arctic’s vast oil, gas, minerals, and fishery resources, and to utilize the Arctic shipping lanes 
more efficiently for trade and tourism (Jakobson, 2010). For example, the Northern Sea 
Route (or Arctic Sea Route) shortens the shipping routes between Asia and Europe by over 
6000 km. The increased interest in the Arctic also brings with it some challenges to the 
region’s economic, military, and environmental governance (Jakobson, 2010). However, 
significant uncertainties exist not only with regard to the estimates/measurements of the ice 
  30 
thickness and its extent, but even more so with regard to predictions on the future of the 
Arctic ice.  
In this report, we present two perspectives, the well-known and fairly established view 
published by the IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007), and the view of the 
independent Russian research groups from the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (St. 
Petersburg) based on their research in the Arctic over the last decade. 
The IPCC projections on the Arctic Sea ice extent indicate that the ice melt will continue 
throughout the 21st century, and that the late summer sea ice could disappear almost entirely 
toward the end of the projection period. However, Russian scientists have recently 
introduced a different Arctic ice scenario. They predict a continuation (not trend) of the 
oscillatory character of the dynamics of the Arctic Sea ice area attributable primarily to 
regional specificities of climate cycles and long period trends. They expect that the ice area 
will increase during the summer during the period 2020–2040, and will reach its peak 
sometime between 2030–2035 in the Eastern Seas and in 2035 in the Western Seas. The 
second peak is likely to occur around 2090–2095. The period of lower ice cover is expected in 
2050–2070 and at the beginning of the 22nd century. This projection contradicts the 
conclusions IPCC AR4 arrives at, namely, that a dramatic shrinking and even disappearance 
of the ice cover along the ASR will begin as early as the 2050s. 
Even if the most optimistic scenarios of the IPCC on Arctic melting turned out to be correct, 
there are challenges that could make the use of the Northern Sea Route and other Arctic 
shipping lanes unfeasible in the near future. Jakobson (2010) mentions high insurance 
premiums, lack of infrastructure, harsh conditions, problems with drift ice and icebergs, as 
well as shallow depths in some of the passages. 
3.5.1 Arctic Sea ice extent according to the IPCC (2007) 
Sea ice plays an important role in the global climatic system, since it increases the albedo 
(reflectance) in high latitudes, modifies the exchange of heat, gases, and momentum 
between the atmosphere and oceans, and redistributes fresh water via transport and melt of 
sea ice (IPCC, 2007). Arctic Sea ice is especially sensitive to global warming. Late summer 
sea ice is projected to disappear almost completely toward the end of the 21st century. A 
number of positive feedbacks in the climate system will accelerate the melt back of sea ice: 
(1) The ice-albedo feedback allows open water to receive more heat from the sun during 
summer, and (2) warmer waters and stronger circulation further reduce the ice cover. Some 
climatically important characteristics of sea ice are its concentration, extent or edge position, 
total area and multi-year area, its velocity, thickness (closely connected with ice strength, 
which influences the navigability with ships), as well as its growth and melt rates (IPCC, 
2007).  
The melting of sea ice does not affect the sea level, since it already floats in the sea. This 
does not apply to the ice sheets that lie on top of land. The most important ice sheet masses 
worldwide are the Greenland and the Antarctic ice sheets, and changes in their mass balance 
have implications for the sea level. The IPCC maintains that the potential rise in sea level 
could reach between approximately 7 to 57 meters, if the Greenland or Antarctic ice sheet 
melts, respectively. The IPCC (2007) has determined that the Greenland ice sheet is currently 
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undergoing inland thickening, faster near-coastal thinning and a recent acceleration in overall 
shrinkage. According to the IPCC (2007), the melting of the Greenland ice sheet is expected 
to continue. 
Sea ice extent is the only ice variable for which observations are available over several 
decades. The measurement accuracy of the satellite radiometers is approximately 12 to 25 
kilometers, depending on the instruments used. Recently launched instruments have 
improved accuracy and provide important additional data to previous observations, e.g., on 
the dynamics of the ice sheets. The CryoSat was recently launched and will provide 
necessary data to fill the current knowledge gaps (Schiermeier, 2010).  
The IPCC (2007) presented a time series of the Arctic Sea ice extent from the end of the 
1970s until 2005 based on satellite data. The Arctic Sea ice extent is experiencing a 
significant decreasing trend, whereas the Antarctic indicates a slightly positive trend (Fig. 2). 
The trends are stronger in the summer and weaker in winter. Figure 3 illustrates the trends 
of the sea ice extent in March and September from 1978 to 2009, as presented in AMAP 
(2009). The figures (Fig. 3 and 4) clearly show that a substantial interannual to decadal 
variability exists. In Figure 4, the Russian data indicate anomalously little ice during the 
1940s and 1950s, whereas the Nordic Sea data denote an anomalously large ice extent at 
this time, emphasizing the importance of regional variability (IPCC, 2007). 
Figure 2  Sea ice extent anomalies relative to the mean of the entire period for the 
Northern Hemisphere, based on passive microwave satellite data.*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Symbols indicate annual mean values, the smooth blue curves show decadal variations, and the 
dashed lines indicate linear trend lines. 
Source: IPCC, 2007.
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Figure 3  Sea ice extent: Average percentage difference from 1979–2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMAP, 2009. 
Figure 4  Long-term time series of the Northern Hemisphere (NH), Nordic Seas, and 
Russian Archipelago Sea ice extents based on several sources (see details in 
IPCC, 2007). For the NH time series, the symbols indicate annual values, while 
the curves signify the decadal variation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IPCC, 2007. 
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3.5.2 Future projections of the Arctic Sea ice extent according to the IPCC (2007) 
Atmospheric model results project future warming which is amplified at high latitudes (IPCC, 
2007). The warming is most prevalent in autumn or early spring. The models reveal a range 
of possibilities in the Northern Hemisphere sea ice extent, from very little change to a severe 
and accelerated reduction during the 21st century, depending on the given scenario (Figure 
5). The summer ice area is projected to decline more rapidly than that of the winter ice. 
Figure 6 illustrates the decrease of the Arctic Sea ice minimum extent in 1982 and 2007, and 
climate projections on a map based on satellite observations (National Snow and Ice Data 
Center, NSIDC) and ACIA (2004) models.  
Figure 5  Multi-model simulated anomalies in the sea ice extent for the 20th (20c3m) and 
21st century using the SRES A2, A1B, and B1, as well as the commitment 
scenario for (a) Northern Hemisphere from January to March (JFM), and (b) 
Northern Hemisphere from July to September (JAS).*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The solid lines represent the multi-model mean, the shaded areas denote ±1 standard deviation. Sea 
ice extent is defined as the total area where sea ice concentration exceeds 15%. Anomalies are relative 
to the period 1980 to 2000. The number of models is provided in the legend and differs for each 
scenario. 
Source: IPCC, 2007. 
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Figure 6  The decrease of the Arctic Sea ice minimum extent in 1982 and 2007 based on 
satellite data (NSIDC), and climate projections based on ACIA 2004 models.*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Figure prepared by Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal (http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/the-
decrease-of-arctic-sea-ice-minimum-extent-in-1982-and-2007-and-climate-projections) 
3.6 Arctic shipping 
According to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (Arctic Council, 2009), natural 
resource development and regional trade are the key drivers of increased Arctic maritime 
activity, but a large number of challenges define the future and may limit the development of 
future maritime operations in the Arctic area. Key governance and infrastructure challenges 
for Arctic shipping are listed below based on key findings of AMSA (Arctic Council, 2009):  
 There are still open questions and divergent national views about the legal status of 
the Arctic shipping lanes, e.g., which country has claims over the waters, etc. The 
legal status has consequences with regard to the extent to which a given coastal 
state can unilaterally impose construction, crewing, and equipment standards; 
 Development of meteorological, oceanographical and ice information services, as well 
as the development of hydrographic services and charts (especially the Northwest 
Passage). Despite the longer navigation seasons, ice conditions will continue to 
present a challenge for maritime navigation in the Arctic in the future and due to 
climate variability, the ice situation will vary from year-to-year; 
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 Lack of binding and harmonized polar vessel construction standards. The IMO 
standards could, for example, be developed to achieve this aim. This also applies to 
cruising ships operating in the Arctic; 
 Monitoring and controlling the movement of ships in the Arctic;  
 Limitations to radio and satellite communication coverage; 
 Lack of emergency response capacity; 
 Availability of skilled mariners and ice navigators that are used for Arctic conditions. 
There are no requirements for education, training and/or certification of Arctic 
mariners and navigators; 
 The availability and costs of marine insurance for the Arctic. 
Finnish institutions and industry have experience with several of the above-mentioned points 
and these challenges can, therefore, be tackled with Finnish know-how, especially if Arctic 
shipping activity increases. AMSA (Arctic Council, 2009), for example, states that icebreaking 
technology will play an important role in Arctic shipping in the future. New Arctic shipping 
technologies also imply that independently-operated, icebreaking commercial ships could 
assume operations in the future. Obviously, changes in global trade, resource pricing 
(including oil prices), and the future development of competing routes (Suez Canal, Panama 
Canal, and the Trans-Siberian railroad as the most significant ones) will also affect the 
attractiveness of the Arctic shipping lanes. 
3.6.1 The Northwest and Northeast Passages 
The Northwest Passage consists of various maritime routes between the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans along the northern coast of Northern America in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
(Arctic Council, 2009, see Fig. 7). The Canadian Arctic Archipelago comprises 36.000 islands 
which are sparsely populated with less than 30.000 inhabitants. Many ecologically sensitive 
areas exist throughout the region. Additionally, there are many narrow and shallow areas in 
the Archipelago, many of which are uncharted. Ice is present most of the year and thus 
presents a challenge for maritime navigation.  
The sea ice conditions in the Canadian Arctic have shown negative trends in coverage for the 
past three decades with a high year-to-year variability in all regions (Arctic Council, 2009). In 
the changing climate, the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is, however, expected to be one of the 
last areas of the Arctic Ocean to have significant summer ice cover. In spite of more 
favorable ice situations in the summer, sea ice will be present throughout the most part of 
the year (approximately nine months out of the year), and therefore, access to the 
Northwest Passage will continue to be controlled by ice conditions (Arctic Council, 2009).  
Somanathan et al. (2006) modeled the Northwest Passage and found it economically 
favorable compared with the traditional route through the Panama Canal between harbors in 
eastern Canada and northeastern Asia. AMSA (Arctic Council, 2009) has estimated, in turn, 
that most of the Arctic travel by 2020 will still be destinational rather than trans-Arctic. 
Destinational shipping activities are projected to rise due to an increase in the re-supply to 
the Arctic communities, expanding resource development, and tourism. AMSA (Arctic Council, 
2009) concludes that the Northwest Passage is not expected to have become a viable trans-
Arctic route by 2020 due to the uncertainty in conditions, e.g., seasonal variability, ice 
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conditions, a complex archipelago, lack of adequate charts, and high insurance and other 
costs. 
In contrast, Verny & Grigentin (2009) conclude that the Northeast Passage is a viable 
alternative transit route compared with the shipping lanes through the Suez Canal (the Royal 
Route) and the Trans-Siberian railroad. However, they estimate that the respective costs 
would be 100% and 30% higher for the Northeast Passage than on the Royal Route and the 
Trans-Siberian. Shipping and fuel costs accounted for over 90 percent of the total Northeast 
Passage operating costs.  
With regard to the Northern Sea Route (NSR) or the Northeast Passage, AMSA (Arctic 
Council, 2009) asserts that the transport of oil from the Pechora Sea to Europe is both 
technologically and economically feasible, and that the cargo flow today is more than 1.5 
million tons per year. By 2020, the traffic volumes on the NSR are expected to increase to 40 
million tons. The higher traffic volumes will lower the operating charges which are now 
relatively high for the NSR compared with, for example, the Baltic Sea. The AMSA report 
(Arctic Council, 2009) estimated that if the proper technologies are developed and 
implemented, maritime transport costs of oil and gas could be lower than they are for 
pipeline transportation. 
Figure 7  The Arctic Marine Area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Arctic Council, 2009. 
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3.7 Ice conditions in the Arctic Sea Route and projected change in the 
2030s and at the end of the 21st century; The point of view of the 
Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute 
The Arctic Sea Route (ASR) consists of navigable routes mainly through the Russian Arctic, 
stretching from the Barents Sea (Kirkanes in Norway) in the west to the Bering Strait in the 
east. The ASR is the shortest route connecting northwestern Europe and South-East Asia. 
The length of the ASR between the Kara Gate Strait and Bering Strait is approximately 3000 
miles. Using the ASR shortens the distance between Hamburg and Yokohama by nearly 
twice, and the shipping time by 10–14 days compared with the Suez Canal route. However, 
navigation on the ASR is obstructed by sea ice. The entire ASR is covered by ice in winter 
while some parts – particularly in the Laptev Sea and East Siberian Sea – are covered by ice 
even in summer. Hence, an ice-breaker fleet is required to ensure the safety and profitability 
of the shipping industry. 
The maximum cargo transportation along the ASR was reached by the end of the 1980s with 
a level of 5.5–6.5 million tons. This amount has been declining considerably over the last two 
decades (by~2.5 times in western part of the ASR and by~30 times in its eastern part, 
mostly due to Russia’s economic decline (for further details, see Plaksy, 2008). 
3.7.1 Ice conditions in the Eurasian Arctic Seas 
A short review of the past and current ice conditions of the Arctic Seas is presented here 
based on ice maps which were developed by the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (St. 
Petersburg, Russia). These maps are based on regular aerial ice visual and photo 
reconnaissance (1933–1979), joint visual and photo reconnaissance, and satellites (1980–
1990). Since 1990, ice maps based entirely on satellite data have been produced. These 
maps present the areas of ice distribution (ice cover) and the areas of ice tract (i.e., areas 
with an ice covering of 70–100%). 
Processes of ice generation and growth take place over a period of approximately seven 
months (October to May) within the annual cycle of ice conditions in the Arctic Seas. During 
this period, all seas of the Siberian shelf are completely covered by ice of different ages (90–
100% of the area). Fast ice is generated in shallow coastal regions. Ice breakup begins at 
the end of May – beginning of June. 
3.7.1.1 Specifics of ice conditions during fall and winter 
Ice generation and growth. Fall and winter represent the most important seasons in the 
annual cycle of the seasonal dynamics of ice conditions in the Arctic. Primary ice formations 
(ice needles, studgy ice, etc.) on ice-free water usually develop at the end of August – 
beginning of September. Steady ice formation refers to the time it takes for primary forms of 
ice to develop into steady ice. Early periods of ice formation usually predetermine the 
complexity of ice conditions during winter.  
The general characteristics of the temporal distribution of ice formation are presented in a 
map of isochrones with an average of many years of steady ice formation times (Fig. 8). 
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Figure 8  Average times of steady ice formation in the Arctic Seas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steady ice formation begins at the end of August, north of the East Siberian Sea, and north 
of the Kara and the Laptev Seas in the first week of September, and continues to form north 
of the East Siberian Sea by September 20th. Ice formation in shallow coastal zones begins in 
early October. On average, the Laptev and East Siberian Seas are frozen within 35–40 days, 
the Kara and Chukchi Seas within 80–85 days. The time of steady ice formation varies 
considerably (from 30 to 80 days), particularly in regions affected by the advection of water 
from warmer regions. The depth of the ice increases in accordance with its age: Nilas (up to 
10 cm), grey ice (between 10 and 15 cm), grey-white (15 to 30 cm) [these three types are 
usually referred to as ‘young ice’], one-year thin ice (30 to 70 cm), one-year medium ice (70 
to 120 cm) and one-year thick ice (with a depth of > 120 cm). Two- and many-year ice is 
found in northern parts of the Arctic Seas. The thickness of the ice cover is usually 
heterogeneous, owing to the migration of the ice field from the north. 
Fast ice and ice-holes. A distinguishable feature of the Arctic Seas’ ice regime is the 
occurrence of fast ice, i.e., immovable ice, mostly in shallow and island regions. The width of 
fast ice can reach hundreds of kilometers in the central Arctic Seas (Fig. 8). Fast ice develops 
until March or April. By then, fast ice covers, on average, 27% of the total ice cover of the 
seas of the Siberian shelf. The maximum thickness of fast ice is 190–210 cm, on average, for 
the Laptev and East Siberia Seas, 150–160 cm west of the Kara Sea, and 170 cm south of 
the Chukchi Sea. 
Ice holes form along the entire boundary of fast ice, namely, between fast and drifting ice. 
Ice holes consist of areas of free water or young ice, with a width ranging from tens to 
hundreds of kilometers. They either exist permanently or sporadically. The stability of ice 
holes is classified by their recurrence: >75% are stationary ice-holes (e.g., south of the Kara 
and Laptev Seas), 50 to 74% are stable, and <50% are sporadic (west of the East Siberian 
and Chukchi Seas). 
By the end of the ice cover formation period (usually May), one-year ice with a thickness of 
>120 cm has developed, covering around 60 to 85% of the area of the Arctic Seas. Two- and 
many-year old ice is widespread in the East Siberian, Laptev and Chukchi Seas (Fig. 9). 
 
  39
Figure 9  Average distribution of the age of ice in the Arctic Seas by the end of the growth 
period of ice cover. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7.2 Ice conditions during spring and summer 
Destruction of ice cover. The thawing of ice begins in mid-May – second week of June. In 
principle, all types of ice thaw by the end of summer, aside from thick one-year ice, old ice, 
and pack ice. Fast ice usually thaws within 1 to 2 weeks in July. The disintegration of the ice 
cover occurs together with its destruction and is attributable to heat and dynamic processes. 
This leads to the development of zones of different ice density: Rare (1–3 tenths), sparse (4–
6 tenths), dense (7–8 tenths) and very dense (9–10 tenths). Numerous years of observation 
have shown that a dense ice cover is usually formed in certain regions of the Arctic Sea. Such 
areas are referred to as ice tracts. 
Ice tracts. The ice of ice tracts is distinguished by its considerable thickness and hummocky 
structure. Nine ice tracts exist in the Arctic Seas of the Siberian Shelf (Fig. 10). The Novaya 
Zemlya tract blocks shipping through the Novaya Zemlya Strait until the second half of 
August, as well as through the Severnaya Zemly Strait and the Vilkitsky Strait. The Taimir 
tract is the largest ice tract (approximately 30% of the region’s area). Its ice can impede 
navigation over the entire summer. The Yana tract obstructs shipping from the East Siberian 
to the Laptev Sea through the Sannikov Strait and usually disintegrates by the end of August. 
The Novosibirsk tract does not cause any particular problems for navigation. The Ajon tract is 
the largest in the Arctic Seas, and consists of thick and pack ice. However, the ASR in this 
part of the Arctic is usually free of ice in August and September. The Kara North and Chukchi 
tracts are outside of the ASR. 
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Figure 10  Location of ice tracts in the Arctic Seas.*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
*1 - Novaya Zemlya, 2 - Kara North, 3 -Severnaya Zemlya, 4 - Taimir, 5 -Jana, 6 -Novosibirsk, 7 -Ajon, 
8 -Wrangel, 9 -Chukot North. 
Clearing of seas from ice. The most intensive clearing of the Arctic Seas from ice is observed 
in August, and lasts until the end of September (Table 4). 
Table 4  Area of the Arctic Seas free from ice at the end of June to September in %. 
Months 
Parts of the Sea 
VI VII VIII IX 
South-West of Kara Sea 17 50 90 97 
North-East of Kara Sea 5 20 40 56 
West of the Laptev Sea 10 23 46 48 
East of Laptev Sea 10 31 74 84 
West of East Siberian Sea 6 14 44 56 
East of East Siberian Sea 2 7 20 30 
South-West of Chukchi Sea 29 60 78 86 
On average, before the beginning of ice formation, the South-West of the Kara Sea is nearly 
completely free of ice; the eastern part of the Laptev Sea is 84% and the southwestern part 
of the Chukchi Sea is 86% free of ice. Approximately 50% of the northeastern part of the 
Kara Sea and the western part of the Laptev and East Siberian Sea are free of ice prior to the 
onset of ice formation. 
Distribution of ice in the summer. The distribution of the zones that are free of ice, as well as 
the ice fields of different density during the summer is illustrated in maps developed by the 
AARI, based on 10-day survey maps for 1933–1992. 
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Figure 11  Distribution of ice of different density in the Arctic Seas at the end of June to 
September (median value of a number of years). 
 
 
3.7.3 Climatic variation in the Arctic and change in ice conditions in the Arctic Seas 
Results of research carried out by AARI (Frolov et al., 2007, 2009) indicated that long-period 
changes of annual surface air temperature, ice cover density and other hydro-meteorological 
indicators in the Arctic during the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries were characterized 
by the occurrence of several cycles with a duration of approx. 60, 20, 10 and less years. 
These cycles were observed along a quasi-linear warming trend over a time period of 200 
years. The cited sources relied on natural drivers (primarily on the dynamics of incoming 
solar energy) and do not address the anthropogenic impact on the Earth’s climate. 
The results of the most influential 60-year cycle with reference to a change in the climatic 
system were clearly recognizable in the Arctic. However, they were also observed in different 
regions of the planet, including the Antarctic. Interchanging periods of warming and cooling 
during the 20th century identified by many researchers was connected to this cycle. The 
stable manifestation of this cycle in many natural processes in different regions of the Earth 
and during different time periods points to its common natural drivers. 
From a global perspective, the Arctic demonstrated the greatest variability of natural 
processes throughout the entire 20th century. From the onset of the 20th century, the air 
temperature in the Arctic zone (70–85˚ N.L.) experienced a long-period of natural oscillations 
of which the 60-year cycle has clearly been recognized (Fig. 12). This cycle involves 
decreasing air temperatures at the beginning of the century; “warming” of the Arctic in the 
1920s to 1940s with a peak in 1936–1938; cooling from 1960–1980s; and warming beginning 
in the middle of the 1990s and reaching its peak at the beginning of the 21st century. 
Figure 12 demonstrates how the increased temperature impacted the hydro-meteorological 
and ice conditions in the Arctic from the beginning of the 1920s until the middle of the 
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1950s: 1922–1956 represented the warm period, while 1957–1984 represented the cold 
period. Another warm period began in the mid-1980s and continues to this day. 
Figure 12  Dynamics of anomalies of the annual average air temperature (˚C) over the 70-
85˚ northern latitudes of the Eurasian Arctic in the 20th/beginning of the 21st 
centuries and the 60-year cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes in the Arctic Seas’ ice cover during the 20th century were characterized by a 
negative linear trend around which the cyclic oscillations of 60, 20 and 10 years took place. 
These changes had spatial- and temporal-specific features (Frolov et al., 2007, 2009). In the 
Western Seas (the Greenland, Kara and Barents Seas), the negative linear trend of the ice 
cover was substantial and the main cycle has a length close to 60 years (Fig. 13). In the 
Eastern Seas (the Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi Seas), ice cover oscillations were 
observed around a long-term mean (excluding the last several years). The inter-annual 
variability of the ice cover in these regions was very high and the 60-year cycle has 
apparently become weaker. 
Figure 13  Dynamics of the area of ice: a – in Western (Greenland, Barents, Kara), b – in 
Eastern (Laptevich, East Siberian, Chukchi) Seas in 2008. 
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3.7.4 Recurrence of ice conditions over the ASR under different climatic conditions 
Shipping over the entire ASR is possible in summer and fall, and throughout the entire year 
in the Kara Sea. Major transport routes and regions in which the navigation of ships and even 
of ice-breakers is quite difficult are illustrated in Figure 14. These difficulties are attributable 
to large ice tracts and extensive areas of fast ice. 
Figure 14  Major routes of the ASR and regions with unfavorable ice conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ice density and ice tracts. The ice conditions that pose challenges to the navigation in the 
seas of the ASR are characterized by two indicators: Ice density (i.e., the area of the ice 
covering water) and the area of dense ice (7 to 10 tenths) in ice tracts. Both indicators are 
calculated in percentage of the sea’s areas or in square kilometers. Data that have been used 
for the analysis of ice conditions in the Arctic are presented in Table 5. These data are based 
on observations that were provided in 1933–2009 (data for August). Table 5 provides many-
year variability of ice density in Kara, Laptev and East Siberia Seas. 
Table 5  Ice density in the Arctic Seas between 1933–2009. 
Seas 
Indicators 
Kara Laptev East Siberian Chukchi 
Number of years 77 77 77 77 
Average ice density, in % 46 50 76 32 
Maximum, % 92 90 98 57 
Minimal, % 5 8 10 0 
Amplitude (A), % 87 82 88 57 
1/5A, % 17 16 18 11 
 
The complexity of ice conditions was estimated using a criterion which is equal to 20% of the 
amplitude (A) of many-year oscillations: Heavy conditions correspond to a range of > M 
+0.2A, average conditions to M±0.2A, and light conditions to < M-0.2A. The recurrence of 
these types of ice conditions is presented in Table 6. Average ice conditions were the most 
frequent (the recurrence varies from 51 to 65%). Heavy and light conditions had a similar 
rate of recurrence (19–27% and 16–23%, respectively, see Table 6). 
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Table 6  Number of years (N) and recurrence (P) of different types of ice conditions 
during 1933–2009, %. 
Seas 
Kara Laptev East Siberian Chukchi 
Type of ice 
conditions 
N P, % N P, % N P, % N P, % 
Heavy 15 19 20 26 15 19 21 27 
Light 14 18 18 23 12 16 16 21 
Average 48 62 39 51 50 65 40 52 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present an analysis of the recurrence of types of ice conditions classified in 
the “warm” (1930–1956 and 1985–2009) and “cold” (1957–1984) periods. These data reveal 
that average ice conditions dominate all climatic periods (recurrence of 63%). Both the 
“warm” and “cold” periods have heavy and light ice conditions. Evidently, heavy conditions 
dominate during “cold periods” (the average ratio heavy/light for all seas is 35/11). 
Table 7  Number of years (N) and recurrence (P) of types of ice conditions during 
different climate periods. 
Types of ice conditions 
Heavy Light Average Periods and years N 
N P, % N P, % N P, % 
The Kara Sea 
«Warm», 1933–1956, 1985–2009 49 4 8 16 33 29 59 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 11 39 1 4 16 57 
The Laptev Sea 
«Warm», 1933–1956, 1985–2009 49 12 24 12 24 25 52 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 8 29 6 21 14 50 
The East Siberian Sea 
«Warm», 1933–1956, 1985–2009 49 5 10 13 27 31 63 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 11 39 1 4 16 57 
The Chukchi Sea 
«Warm», 1933–1956, 1985–2009 49 11 22 13 26 25 51 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 9 32 3 11 16 57 
During the “warm” periods, the recurrence of years with light ice conditions is most clearly 
observed in the Kara Sea (light/ heavy = 33/8) and in the East Siberian Sea (27/10). This 
ratio is not clear, and a high recurrence of heavy conditions is observed here as well. The 
overall average light to heavy conditions during the “warm” periods is 27/16. 
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Table 8  Number of years (N) and recurrence (P) of types of development of ice tracts 
during different climatic periods. 
Type of ice conditions 
Heavy Light Average Climatic periods N 
N P, % N P, % N P, % 
Movaya Zemlya ice tract 
«Warm», 1938–1956, 1985–2009 44 7 16 17 39 20 45 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 12 43 3 11 13 46 
Severnaya Zemlya ice tract 
«Warm», 1938–1956, 1985–2009 44 6 14 18 41 20 45 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 13 46 3 11 12 43 
Taimir ice tract 
«Warm», 1938–1956, 1985–2009 44 8 18 14 32 22 50 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 7 25 4 14 17 61 
Jana ice tract 
«Warm», 1938–1956, 1985–2009 42 6 14 12 29 24 57 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 9 32 6 21 13 47 
Novosibirsk ice tract 
«Warm», 1938–1956, 1985–2009 42 7 17 14 33 21 50 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 13 46 9 32 6 22 
Ajon ice tract 
«Warm», 1938–1956, 1985–2009 36 9 25 9 25 18 50 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 8 29 3 11 17 60 
Wrangel ice tract 
«Warm», 1938–1956, 1985–2009 43 9 21 17 39 17 40 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 7 25 6 21 15 54 
Average conditions dominate during all climate periods (40 to 60%). Higher positive 
anomalies of large areas of ice tracts are observed during the “cold” period (large positive 
anomalies to large negative anomalies = 35/16) and vice versa for “warm” periods (15/34). 
Navigation without ice-breakers along the entire ASR. The duration of the period during 
which navigation is possible and when no ice breakers are found along the entire ASR from 
the Kara Gate to the Bering Strait is very important. The duration of this period depends on 
the presence of dense ice, which could appear at individual sites of the ASR, even during 
light ice conditions (see Fig. 15). 
The duration of the period during which navigation along the entire ASR is possible (for ships 
in ice class) and when no ice breakers are required is illustrated in Figure 15. This figure 
indicates that there were years when such navigation was not possible, even during recent 
“warm” periods (1993, 1997, 2001).  
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Figure 15  Duration of the period when navigation was possible along the entire ASR 
without ice breakers in decades (1940–2009) for ships in class UL (LU5) (dotted 
line = the trend approximated by a polynomial of the 3rd power) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 presents the recurrence of different navigation conditions between 1940 and 2009: 
Unfavorable conditions refer to conditions under which shipping without ice-breakers was 
completely impossible (or only possible for one decade) (33%); favorable conditions refer to 
conditions in which through-shipping was possible for over 4 decades (51%), and medium 
conditions are those in which the period of possible shipping comprised 1.5 to 3.5 decades 
(23%). 
Table 9  Recurrence of shipping without ice-breakers along the entire ASR from 1940 to 
2009. 
Navigation conditions 
Length of shipping without 
ice breakers, decades Number of years Recurrence in % 
Favorable 4–8 27 51 
Medium 1,5–3,5 20 16 
Unfavorable 0–1 23 33 
During the “warm” periods, the recurrence of favorable conditions was about two times 
higher than the recurrence of the unfavorable ones (Table 10). 
Table 10  Number of years (N) and recurrence (P) of shipping without ice-breakers along 
the entire ASR during the different climatic periods. 
Type of ice conditions 
Favorable Medium Unfavorable Climatic periods N 
N P, % N P, % N P, % 
«Warm», 1940–1956, 1985–2009 42 19 45 13 31 10 24 
«Cold», 1957–1984 28 8 29 7 25 13 46 
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3.8 Prediction of ice conditions for 2030–2040 and by the end of the 21st 
century (forecast by the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute)  
The stable character of the natural 60-year cycle of changes in air temperature in the Arctic 
throughout the 20th century (and for longer periods in other regions of the planet) provides 
the foundation for climatic change forecasts of AARI in the Arctic during the 21st century 
(Figure 16). 
Based on a physical-statistical approach and averages for the 20st century amplitude of the 60-
year cycle, experts from AARI developed a background forecast of the dynamics of annual air 
temperature and ice cover of the Arctic Seas for the next few decades (Frolov et al., 2007, 
2009). 
According to this forecast, it is expected that the development of hydro-meteorological and 
ice conditions in the Eurasian Arctic will, over the next 5 to 10 years, be based on elevated 
temperatures with a gradual decrease by 2015, similar to the situation observed at the end 
of the 1st warming of the Arctic. 
A further decrease in the temperature is expected until approximately the mid-2030s to 
2040s. The transition to the next warm period is expected thereafter. This warm period will 
have a limited duration and its peak is expected in the mid-2060s. By the end of this century, 
the next cycle of decreasing temperatures is predicted to begin. 
Figure 16  Change in anomalies of average annual temperature across 70-85˚ northern 
latitudes in the 20th – beginning of the 21st century and the forecast for the 21st 
century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The forecast of probable dynamics of ice cover in the Arctic regions in the 21st century is 
presented in Figure 17. This forecast is based on long-period cycling observed in the Arctic. 
Two major components which have contributed to the long-period variability of the ice area 
in the 21st century have been used to develop the forecast: 60- and 20- year cycles for seas 
of the western region (the Greenland Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Kara Sea), and 60-year 
cycles for the Eastern Seas (Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, and Chukchi Sea). 
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Figure 17  The forecast of change of the total area of ice in the Western (a) and Eastern 
Seas during the 21st century in August. 
 
 
 
 
 
This forecast predicts the continuation (not trend) of the oscillatory character of the 
dynamics of the ice area in the Arctic Seas. During the period 2020–2040, it is expected that 
the ice area will increase during the summer, reaching its peak in 2030–2035 in the Eastern 
Seas and in 2035 in the Western Seas. The second peak is likely to occur around 2090–2095. 
The period of lower ice cover is expected in 2050–2070 and at the beginning of the 22nd 
century. 
One major conclusion of this forecast presented by AARI is that, when taking into account 
regional specifics of climate cycles and long-period trends, a continuation (not trend) of the 
oscillatory character of the dynamics of climatic change in the Arctic takes place. This 
projection contradicts the conclusion of the IPCC AR4, which predicts a dramatic shrinking 
and even disappearance of the ice cover along the ASR, beginning as early as the 2050s. 
3.9 Discussion 
The forecast of climatic and ice conditions developed by the Russian Arctic and Antarctic 
Institute is based on interchanging “warm” and “cold” periods. 
During the “cold” period 2020–2040: This projection anticipates an increase in the areas of 
ice in the Arctic Seas over the summer months, with a peak around 2030–2035, an 
increasing frequency of difficult ice conditions with an elevated recurrence of large positive 
anomalies of areas of ice tracts, and an increasing recurrence of years of unfavorable 
conditions for shipping along the entire ASR without ice-breakers. 
During the subsequent “warm” period 2050–2070: a lower level of ice density is expected, an 
increasing recurrence of light ice conditions and large negative anomalies of the areas of ice 
tracts, an increasing recurrence of favorable conditions for shipping along the entire ASR 
without ice-breakers. 
This forecast thus contradicts the predictions of the IPCC, which are based on AOGCMs. In 
Chapter 3.1, we addressed the uncertainties of any climatic predictions for the Arctic. A 
substantial number of scientists shares the opinion that “data of observation […] do not 
contain any clear signal of anthropogenic conditionality of climate change” and “results of 
numerical modeling of the climate which prove the greenhouse warming hypothesis and 
which supposedly are in tune with observational data, in reality are not more than 
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adjustment to data of observation” (Kondratiev, 2004, p.121). Thus, alternative opinions 
should be considered, at least to complete the picture. 
Figure 18  Forecast of anomalies of surface temperature for high latitudes (60 ºN.L. to the 
North Pole) during the 21st century (deviation from the average for 1980–2000) 
by different AOGCMs . 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ACIA, 2005. 
The noteworthy evidence the proponents base their alternative hypothesis on global warming 
on are as follows: 
 large variation and inconsistencies between the different AOGCMs (the increase in annual 
temperature for high latitudes by different models by the year 2100 ranges from 3.5 to 7 
˚C, Fig. 18); 
 none of the models are able to explain the Arctic warming in the 1920–1940s which is 
not linked to the greenhouse effect; 
 validation of the models is often provided for the last decades but not for the entire 
period of climatic observation; 
 practically all “conventional” publications ignore natural oscillations of hydro-
meteorological processes and phenomena of which input in many-year variability of 
climate is substantially higher than the anthropogenic impact on current climate; 
 inconsistency of temporal change of anthropogenic carbon emissions and global 
warming: Any direct connection between global consumption of fuel and global warming 
in the 20th century was absent (Fig. 19, Klyashtorin and Lyubushin, 2003); 
 anomalies of the surface air temperature in the Arctic zone (70-85˚ N.L.) support the 
cycling decrease according to this forecast: 2007 (the warmest year in the Arctic 
during the current period of warming) -2,2˚ in 2008, –2,0˚ in 2009 г. – 1,7˚; the 
active layer on permafrost decreased by 25% comparatively with 2008 and by 20% 
to the average for the last decade; overall Russia the temperature anomaly was 
+0.55 ˚C (23rd rank from 1936) (Federal Service on Hydrometereology and 
Monitoring of Environment of the Russian Federation, 2010); 
 opposite climatic tendencies in the Arctic and Antarctic, and, as a consequence, an 
increase in the area of sea ice in the Antarctic (Fig. 20, Gudkovich et al., 2008); 
 a number of other (aside from temperature) indicators of general circulation of the 
atmosphere, as well as the dynamics of the area of ice indicates a tendency toward 
cooling during the last years (Frolov et al., 2008); the minimal area of ice was observed 
in 2007; subsequently, it began to increase again (. 11). 
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Table 11  Area of ice in the Arctic Sea in September 2007–2009. 
Anomalies, million m2 
Years S million m2 
from average from 2007 
1978–2009 6.584 – – 
2007 4.345 –2.239 – 
2008 4.706 –1.878 +0.361 
2009 5.200 –1.384 +0,855 
 
Figure 19  Dynamics of global temperature anomalies and global fuel consumption from 
1860–2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Klyashtorin and Lyubushin, 2003. 
Figure 20  Change of average areas of ice in the Arctic and Antarctic in 1979–2008 based 
on data of SSMR-SSM/I, algorithm NASATEAM. 
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As a result of the ongoing warming, light ice conditions are being observed in the Arctic Seas. 
Nevertheless, some parts of the ASR are blocked by ice tracts each year and ice-breakers are 
required for passage. The minimal area of ice in the Arctic was observed in 2007 (Fig. 20), 
while the Taimyr ice tract blocked the eastern route to the Vilkitsky Trait. The same situation 
was observed in 2008; moreover, ice of the Ajon ice tract blocked the eastern part of the 
East Siberian Sea for nearly the entire navigation period in 2008–2009 (Fig. 21). 
Figure 21  Ice area in the Arctic Ocean in August of 2007–2009. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors of this projection perceive the rising trend in air temperature in the Northern 
Hemisphere in the 20th–21st centuries to be part of the multi-century cycle with a duration of 
180–200 years (Bashkirzev & Mashich, 2004; Raspopov et al., 2004). According to the 
astronomer Abdusamatov (2009), the peak of this cycle was reached at the end of the 20th – 
beginning of the 21st century. Our forecast predicts that the next, nineteenth Little Ice-Age 
Period will set in between approximately 2055–2060 (±11).  
The above forecast as an alternative to the “greenhouse theory” to understand the major 
drivers of the ongoing and future climatic change considers the impact on the Earth’s 
atmosphere of the changes of the Total Solar Irradiance (TSI). This includes electromagnetic 
waves of different lengths, solar activity which causes solar wind, and cosmic race which are 
regulated by inter-planet magnetic fields. Indirectly, the impacts of solar activity become 
apparent in the coincidence of the average duration of the cycles recognized in the dynamics 
of air temperature, ice density and solar activity – 11 years cycle, 22 years cycle and 
approximately 60 years cycles, as well as the “200-year cycle” (Bashkirtsev & Mashich, 2004, 
Raspopov et al., 2004). 
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Figure 22  Comparison of change in average annual anomalies of air temperature (ΔT˚) for 
the zone north of 62˚ N.L. with change in solar irradiation (left, linear trends 
and polynomial approximation) and CO2 content in the atmosphere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22 presents the dynamics of the annual anomalies of the surface air temperature and 
TSI received as a composition of the observation of sun-spots and total sun radiation (Hoyt 
and Schatten, 1993), as well as the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere in 1880–2000 
(Soon, 2005) in high latitudes (north of 62˚ N.L.). These graphs are fairly consistent in 
recognizing a century positive trend and quasi-sixty-year cyclic oscillations; the dynamics of 
CO2 has a different character. Figure 21 indicates that the amplitude of change of the full 
solar energy is around 4.0 W/m2, or 0.3% of the solar constant. The 60-year cycle in the 
Arctic is explained by the impacts of the dissymmetry of the solar system (Frolov et al., 2007, 
Frolov et al., 2009). The impacts of the dissymmetry can be realized through solar activity 
and due to changes in distance between the sun and the Earth (Gudkovich et al., 2005). This 
also explains the recognized increase in the role of the 60-year cycle in the latitudinal 
direction and the opposite impact on climatic change in the Arctic and Antarctic (due to 
opposing signs of corresponding anomalies in perihelion and aphelion). 
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4 ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ROLE OF SHORT-LIVED 
CLIMATE FORCERS 
4.1 Introduction 
Arctic temperatures have increased at almost twice the global average rate over the past 100 
years (IPCC, 2007). From 1954 to 2003, annual average surface air temperatures increased 
from 2 to 3 ˚C in Alaska and Siberia during winter months (ACIA, 2004). Warming in the 
arctic has been accompanied by an earlier onset of spring melt, a lengthening of the melt 
season, and a net loss of the Greenland ice sheet. The lengthening of the melt season 
changes the Earth’s albedo, a positive feedback effect which leads to further warming. Arctic 
warming is thus primarily a manifestation of global warming.  
Reductions in the atmospheric burden of CO2 should form the basis for any meaningful effort 
to mitigate climate forcing. But even if swift and profound reductions were achieved, the 
reductions would not necessarily delay the rapid melting of the Arctic, owing to the long life 
time of CO2 in the atmosphere. However, there are shorter-lived climate forcing agents 
(SLCF) than CO2, including primarily black carbon aerosol (BC, commonly known as “soot”), 
tropospheric ozone, and methane (CH4). Due to shorter residence time in the atmosphere 
than CO2 (e.g., days to weeks for BC and 9 years for CH4), the reductions in their 
concentrations would be felt much sooner than the reduction of long-lived greenhouse gases 
(Quinn et al., 2008; Schindell & Faluvegi, 2009; Klimont, 2009). A strategy to reduce SLCF 
(along with CO2) has been proposed by the scientific community (Hansen and Sato, 2001; 
Jackson, 2009; Molina et al., 2009) and more recently, has entered policy discussions, 
emphasizing the role of black carbon (AC-SAO, 2009; UNECE, 2009).  
IIASA has been actively involved in SLCF for a number of years through its research on air 
pollution, and has recently become engaged in work with the Arctic Council. In preparation 
for the Arctic Ministers’ meeting in late April 2009, IIASA co-authored the Draft White Paper 
"Current Policies, Emission Trends and Mitigation Options for Black Carbon in the Arctic 
Region" (Sarofim et al., 2009). This paper was discussed by both Arctic Ministers, as well as 
at the International Melting Ice Conference. Under the current AMAP work plan for the period 
2009–2011, the following tasks referring to the non-CO2 drivers of climate change are listed 
(http://arctic-council.org/working_group/amap): 
 Continue to assess the state of science on SLCF and their impact on the Arctic;  
 Identify gaps in observations of non-CO2 drivers and promote new observations to fill 
those gaps; 
 Assess and seek to improve the capacity of climate models to address short-lived 
climate forcers. 
IIASA continues to be involved in the work of both the Arctic Council Task Force on SLCF and 
the AMAP Expert Group on SLCF. The research expands beyond black carbon by considering 
precursors of tropospheric ozone, including methane. A major contribution of IIASA will be to 
apply the GAINS model to project the effect of current and forthcoming air quality policies, 
specifically those implemented to reduce particulate matter emissions, as these will 
considerably reduce BC. GAINS results, along with other tools, will allow for the climatic 
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impact of BC over time to be evaluated in terms of changes in the geographical and sectoral 
distribution of emissions; it will also identify where additional mitigation measures can make 
a difference and at what cost. The work has been supported by the Clean Air Task Force 
(www.catf.us), a US-based NGO that has been working extensively in this area. 
4.2 Black carbon  
The significance of BC is higher in the Arctic than elsewhere because atmospheric absorption 
is enhanced by the high albedo of snow and ice surfaces (Quinn et al., 2008; AMAP, 2009). 
Furthermore, the albedo of snow and ice is reduced by BC deposition (e.g., Hansen & 
Nazarenko, 2004; Flanner et al., 2009). Therefore, reducing BC emissions may provide a 
means to slow down the Arctic warming and thus constrain the length of the melting season 
and reduce the feedback effects. BC is also a component of particulate matter, which is 
recognized as having adverse health effects. Consequently, the reductions would also bring 
about co-benefits for public health. Since BC is always emitted by other species as well 
(some of them, e.g., organic carbon aerosol (OC) or sulfur dioxide (SO2) have been shown to 
cause cooling), the net-effect of all emitted species should be taken into account when 
assessing climate effects. 
4.2.1  Important source sectors  
Since BC is not well mixed globally, the main source sectors and regions of BC transported to 
the Arctic have to be studied and identified before developing any reasonable reduction 
strategies (Law & Stohl, 2007, Quinn et al., 2008). Recent research (e.g., Stohl, 2006; 
Hirdman et al., 2010) has shown that emissions from high-latitude Eurasia are important 
contributors to Arctic surface concentrations of BC. The Arctic surface concentrations are 
extremely sensitive to emissions within the Arctic (Hirdman et al., 2010) and possible 
changes in local source activities (e.g., shipping, oil and gas drilling) thus play an important 
role as well. The upper Arctic atmosphere is affected by emissions from northern Eurasia, as 
well as North America. The concentrations of BC are enhanced in the Arctic atmosphere 
during winter and spring when the transport of pollutants from lower latitudes is most 
efficient (Quinn et al., 2008); therefore, the seasonality of the emission should be taken into 
account when planning effective mitigation measures. 
Black carbon is generated due to incomplete combustion of fossil fuels or biomass. Large 
global black carbon sources include diesel engines, domestic burning (e.g., cook stoves), 
biomass burning, and industrial sources (Bond et al., 2004). While some BC is produced in 
the Arctic itself, most pollution is transported from the eight Arctic Council nations and the 
near-Arctic regions (north of latitude 40), which includes much of the European Union, 
Russia, Ukraine, China (north of Beijing), Canada, and part of the United States. As 
illustrated in Figure 22 (based on the results of Bond et al., 2004), the use of diesel fuel, 
open burning (both agricultural burning and wildfires), and residential combustion of solid 
fuels account for most of the BC that reaches the Arctic (Sarofim et al., 2009).  
What this figure does not show are emissions from explorations of oil and gas in the northern 
latitudes. However, estimates of BC (or any other pollutant) from this source are very 
uncertain and measurements on these sources have only recently been initiated. Preliminary 
estimates of the GAINS model indicate that emissions of BC from flaring might contribute up 
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to 10% of the currently estimated BC total in the Arctic, originating primarily in Russia and 
the North Sea. The national emission structure varies from country to country (see Fig. 24 for 
Finland) and consequently, an abatement strategy may need to take these differences into 
account. 
Figure 23  Contribution of primary sources by the Arctic nations to total BC emissions in 
2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quinn et al. (2008) assert that reducing black carbon concentrations requires targeting 
sources that emit aerosols with a high absorptivity and relatively low reflectance (e.g., diesel 
combustion and residential cook stoves). Effective mitigation to reduce within-Arctic 
emissions of black carbon may require implementing emission controls on maritime vessels 
operating within Arctic waters, especially since the shipping traffic is likely to increase if the 
sea ice extent and the snow/ice pack decrease (Quinn et al., 2008; IMO, 2010). Additional 
strategies include reducing the prescribed agricultural burning in Eastern Europe so that 
black carbon (as well as organic carbon) emission and deposition does not occur in spring 
when the transport of pollutants to the Arctic is heightened.  
4.2.2 Finnish national emissions and emission scenarios  
Estimates of BC emissions are fraught with significant uncertainties (e.g., Kupiainen & 
Klimont, 2007; Bond et al., 2004) owing to the lack of dedicated measurements that reflect 
on regional operating practices, fuels, and technologies, but also to poor activity data for 
some of the key sectors such as residential biofuel combustion. Figure 10 illustrates the 
Finnish national BC emissions by key sectors, estimated by various research groups for the 
year 2000. They vary by up to 30% at the national level, while the divergence is even 
greater at the sectoral level. The following datasets are presented: 
 FRES’ - estimate by the Finnish Regional Emission Scenario model (FRES) of the 
Finnish Environment Institute (Kupiainen & Karvosenoja, 2010);  
 ‘Bond’ - the global inventory for 1996 (Bond et al., 2004) recently scaled to the year 
2000 (Sarofim et al., 2009);  
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 ‘GAINS’ - IIASA’s GAINS model (http://gains.iiasa.ac.at), which calculated two energy 
data sets – ‘nat’ based on the national Finish submission within the framework of the 
revision of the Gothenburg Protocol, and ‘IEA’ based on the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) database.  
In general, all datasets demonstrate that traffic (road and off-road) and domestic combustion 
(primary wood burning) are the most important source sectors in Finland. However, Bond et 
al. (2004) estimate significantly higher emissions from transport than other research, owing 
to their assumption that a certain proportion of vehicles (about 5–10%) belong to the so-
called ‘high emitters’ with emissions several times higher than vehicles that comply with the 
prescribed country-specific vehicle emission standards. GAINS, on the other hand, arrives at 
consistently higher estimates for domestic combustion and lower ones for industry. The 
primary reasons for the divergences in the domestic sector include – beyond emission factors 
– differences in fuel wood consumption, shares and detailed assumptions about the 
combustion technologies in place as well as their operation practices. The three teams 
providing the BC estimates illustrated in Figure 23 are collaborating on the harmonization of 
estimates for the Arctic nations under the Arctic Council Task Force on SLCF, the AMAP 
expert group on SLCF, and the Clean Air Task Force. The work is expected to be finalized by 
mid-2011. 
Figure 24  Finnish BC emissions (Gg a-1) by sector in 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next figure (Fig. 25) presents the expected changes in total BC emissions in Finland until 
2030. Abstracting from the difference in the estimate for the base year, the trends up to 
2020 are virtually the same in all projections. All of these scenarios assume successful 
implementation of the current policy targeting air pollutants, and not BC specifically. The 
‘FRES’ projection for 2010 and 2020 originates from the 2005 national climate strategy WAM 
(With Additional Measures), while GAINS’ IEA projections were developed on the basis of the 
IEA World Energy Outlook 2009 (IEA, 2009). The discrepancy between the ‘REF’erence and 
the ‘450’ scenario for the year 2030 is attributable to different assumptions on the future of 
Finland’s energy system to meet the current goals of the national policy (REF) or to achieve a 
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global stabilization of CO2 concentrations at the level of 450 ppm. The ‘450’ scenario is based 
on more biofuel use in the residential sector, among others, which leads to higher BC 
emissions (cf. Fig. 26). Consequently, the impact of CO2 driven climate policies (GAINS IEA 
450 vs. GAINS IEA REF) needs to be carefully evaluated, assuring that it also results in 
reduced climate forcing, since aerosols like BC and other co-emitted SLCF contribute to 
warming. 
Figure 25  Expected evolution of BC emissions in Finland until 2030.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The comparison of sectoral emissions in Finland in 2000 and 2020 (Fig. 26) indicates that 
while it is expected that transport sector emissions will be reduced effectively, the role of 
domestic combustion will increase, and that emissions from this sector may actually rise in 
absolute terms. The contribution from transport sources is declining due to the increased 
share of vehicles with enhanced emission abatement (Euro-levels), which also leads to a 
significant reduction in BC emission rates. The scenarios presented assume improvements in 
the combustion technology used in the domestic sector (new and more efficient stoves, etc.), 
but their application is offset by the expected growth in fuel wood use, thus making this 
sector Finland’s leading BC contributor in the future. However, close monitoring of whether 
the Euro-X technologies deliver the anticipated reductions in the future is necessary, as well 
as of the objective to limit the number of high emitting vehicles to a minimum by, e.g., the 
extension of maintenance and repair programs which might be of considerable significance 
for off-road machinery with its very long lifetimes. 
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Figure 26  Baseline (2000) and future (2020) estimates of sectoral BC emissions in Finland 
based on selected studies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Abatement potential  
None of the existing laws specifically target the reduction of BC, although a number of policy 
initiatives have taken it into consideration (AC-SAO, 2009; UNECE, 2009; UNEP, 2009ab). 
However, since BC is co-emitted with several controlled pollutants, a reduction in emissions 
by several sectors is expected as demonstrated in the previous section for the current 
legislation scenario (CLE) for Finland.  
Similarly, recent global BC projections estimate declining emissions in North America, Europe, 
and parts of the former Soviet Union block (Cofala et al., 2007; Streets et al., 2004). As 
already indicated in the preceding section, a reduction is not expected to come about in all 
sectors, and it is important to evaluate these changes in detail considering that location of 
the emissions and season plays a role from the arctic point of view (Quinn et al., 2008; see 
also next section). For example, emissions from northern areas are more likely transported 
over snow or ice-covered regions where they are also more likely to result in net warming 
(Sarofim et al., 2009). 
Further reductions in BC could, for example, be achieved by introducing diesel retrofits 
(especially for off-road diesel machinery) and reducing or shifting the timing of open burning 
of crop residues, particularly in Eastern Europe and northern Asia. The latter factor is 
important because the burning of crop residue at present largely takes place in spring (cf. 
Fig. 26), when the emissions reach the Arctic. Furthermore, reductions in the domestic sector 
could be achieved by encouraging or enforcing the use of the best available combustion 
technology as soon as possible, although such strategies would only be effective at a later 
point owing to the long lifetime of the equipment in question. The latter strategy would not 
only reduce emission rates per unit of fuel, but would also lead to lower biofuel consumption. 
Last but not least, within and near-arctic sources, such as shipping and flaring in oil and gas 
production facilities, should be targeted. 
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The question regarding the possible importance of shipping emissions has been evaluated by 
Corbett et al (2010). Although Arctic shipping does not, in total, contribute a significant 
amount to the region’s air emissions, including BC, the emission occurs far north and 
therefore has a stronger climate impact (Quinn et al., 2008). They are projected to rise 
together with increasing shipping activity owing to the decline in ice coverage (Arctic Council, 
2009, Corbett et al., 2010). Corbett et al. (2010) estimated that BC emissions from Arctic 
shipping could rise up to 5 Gg a-1 (high growth, no control scenario). This is a major concern, 
because the order of magnitude is similar to, for example, emissions projected for the whole 
of Finland in 2020 (Fig. 26). Possible future shipping fuel quality regulations through the 
MARPOL Annex VI legislation, for example, on sulfur content, do not necessarily reduce BC 
emissions, albeit BC mitigation may benefit from it because some BC controls require lower 
sulfur fuels (Corbett et al., 2010). However, in order to asses the net radiative forcing of such 
a strategy, the impact on SO2 emissions must be considered since they contribute to climate 
cooling. 
Figure 27  Satellite images of agricultural burning fires in the Northern Hemisphere (Pettus, 
2009). (Maps produced by Arthur Lembo, Assistant Professor of Geology and 
Geoscience at Salisbury University, using MODIS active fire and land use data). 
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A heated debate on geoengineering solutions to climate change is currently taking place. 
Proposed solutions also include options that focus on regional problems, like the disappearing 
Arctic Sea ice (Royal Society, 2009). For example, a technology that involves seeding clouds 
with sea salt to increase their brightness has been discussed within the Arctic context (Royal 
Society, 2009; Tollefson, 2010). The primary concerns with regard to the technology include 
the potential impact on rainfall patterns over down-wind land areas and the possible adverse 
effects of local cooling on winds and ocean currents (Royal Society, 2009). Geoengineering 
may provide interesting opportunities to mitigate climate change, but could also bear 
substantial risks in terms of adverse side-effects, and responsible approaches should 
therefore be studied carefully. A group of scientists intends to present a relevant research 
program to the Arctic Council for approval (Tollefson, 2010). 
We have developed a preliminary assessment of BC abatement potential for 2020 for all 
Arctic nations under the umbrella of the Arctic Council TF on SLCF. This assessment was 
presented at the last meeting of the Task Force in San Francisco (10–12 February 2010) and 
respective data sets are being prepared for review by national experts. Here, a summary of 
Finland’s abatement potential (Fig. 28) is presented, calculated for the GAINS national 
scenario. The key sector for which a reduction potential was identified is residential 
combustion (as discussed earlier); more specifically, about 80% of the reduction potential in 
the domestic sector is associated with fuel wood use in heating stoves, and the model 
assumes the introduction of improved stoves, as well as a restricted (up to 35%) 
replacement with pellet stoves. These assumptions need further verification which was 
initiated in the Arctic Council TF consultations. Not only reduction potentials, but also cost 
estimates of reduction measures need careful evaluation and must take national factors into 
account. 
The next key sector in which a reduction in BC can be achieved is off-road machinery. The 
options rank lower on the cost curve (lower marginal costs), but do not represent a major 
mitigation potential. However, their age and geographical distribution is important and needs 
to be better understood to ensure that any future policy targeting these sources addresses 
the worst polluters. 
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Figure 28  Preliminary cost curve and abatement potential of BC emissions for Finland in 
2020 (GAINS model). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Particulate matter transport to the Arctic 
Figure 29 illustrates the transfer coefficients for primary particulate matter from European 
source regions (including European Russia) to the Arctic, using three different definitions for 
the Arctic. A…north of 68˚N, B…north of 72°N, and C…north of 75˚N. These results are 
derived from the EMEP model calculations (Kiesewetter, 2009) and indicate that Arctic 
pollution levels are most sensitive to the northern-most European countries, with Norway 
ranking first before Finland and Sweden (Kiesewetter, 2009).  
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Figure 29  Transfer coefficients from European source regions to the Arctic, using three 
different definitions for the Arctic. A…north of 68˚N, B…north of 72°N, C…north 
of 75˚N.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations: Norway NO, Finland FI, Atlantic Ocean ATL, Sweden SE, Great Britain GB, Estonia EE, 
Baltic Sea BAS, North Sea NOs, Denmark DK, European Russia RU. 
Source: Kiesewetter, 2009.  
In order to estimate the actual impact on the Arctic, these coefficients should be further 
weighted by country-specific emissions. Figure 30 presents the country and sea area-specific 
contributions to Arctic BC concentration in 2000–2030 based on the CLE 2007 Baseline 
Scenario (left) and the CLE 2007 Baseline / RU red scenario (right) based on the IIASA 
GAINS model. The influence of Finnish emissions is estimated to be approximately the fourth 
largest.  
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Figure 30 Contributions to Arctic BC concentration based on the ‘CLE 2007 Baseline’ 
scenario (left) and the ‘CLE 2007 Baseline/RU red’ scenario (right).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Rest” refers to the rest of Europe as considered in the EMEP model. In both scenarios, ship emissions 
from the RCP 8.5 scenario were added (showing up explicitly as Atlantic emissions, ATL).  
Figure from Kiesewetter, 2009. 
The analysis carried out by Kiesewetter (2009) relied on a dated set of data on emissions 
(CLE 2007 Baseline), which were developed around 2005. The most recent GAINS 
calculations reveal some significant changes in absolute BC emissions by the Arctic nations. 
The reasons for this include updated emission factors and activity data which, in some 
countries, notably Norway, lead to lower BC. However, this does not affect the finding on the 
relative significance of Arctic nations’ emissions and we expect the level of importance to 
remain. We intend to update this analysis with new emission data in the near future. 
4.4 Summary and concluding remarks 
Reductions in the atmospheric burden of CO2 shall form the basis of any meaningful effort to 
mitigate climate forcing. But even if swift and profound reductions are made, the rapid 
melting of the Arctic may not be delayed owing to the long lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere. 
However, there are shorter-lived climate forcing agents (SLCF) than CO2, including black 
carbon aerosol (BC, commonly known as “soot”), tropospheric ozone, and methane (CH4). 
Due to a shorter residence time in the atmosphere than CO2, reductions in their 
concentrations could be felt much more quickly than the decrease in long-lived greenhouse 
gases (Quinn et al., 2008; Schindell & Faluvegi 2009; Klimont, 2009). 
The significance of BC is higher in the Arctic than elsewhere, because atmospheric absorption 
is enhanced by the high albedo of snow and ice surfaces (Quinn et al., 2008; AMAP, 2009). 
In addition, the albedo of snow and ice is reduced by BC deposition (e.g., Hansen & 
Nazarenko, 2004; Flanner et al., 2009). Therefore, reducing BC emissions may provide a 
means to cool down the Arctic environment, to limit the length of the melting season, and 
reduce the feedback effects. 
The use of diesel fuel, open burning (both agricultural burning and wildfires), and residential 
combustion of solid fuels account for the majority of BC that reaches the Arctic (Sarofim et 
  64 
al., 2009). Potentially large, but as of yet poorly quantified, emissions result from the 
exploration of oil and gas in the northern latitudes; Preliminary estimates by the GAINS 
model indicate that flaring could contribute up to 10% of the currently estimated total Arctic 
nations’ BC emissions, originating primarily in Russia and the North Sea. Considering only 
Europe, Arctic pollution levels are most sensitive to the northern-most European countries, 
with Norway ranking first before Finland and Sweden (Kiesewetter, 2009). 
The sectors with the highest BC emissions in Finland include transport (road and off-road) 
and domestic combustion (primarily, wood burning). It is expected that by 2020 transport 
sector emissions will have been effectively reduced due to an increased share of vehicles 
with enhanced emission abatement (Euro-levels). However, close monitoring of whether 
technology delivers the expected reductions in the future is necessary, as is the objective to 
limit the number of high emitting vehicles to a minimum by, e.g., extending maintenance and 
repair programs which could be of considerable significance for off-road machinery with its 
very long lifetimes. The scenarios presented anticipate improvements in the combustion 
technology used in the domestic sector (new and more efficient stoves, etc.), but their 
application will be offset by the expected growth in fuel wood use, making this sector 
Finland’s highest BC contributor in the future.  
A comparison of emissions from all Arctic Council nations reveals that Finland only 
contributes a few percent of total emissions that affect the Arctic and obviously cannot bring 
about significant reductions in emissions or forcing on its own. Consolidated international 
action, e.g., ongoing activities under the umbrella of the Arctic Council, is required. 
The national emission structure will vary from country to country and consequently, a 
consolidated abatement strategy may need to take the differences into account. None of the 
existing laws specifically targets the reduction of BC, although it has been considered by a 
number of policy initiatives (AC-SAO, 2009; UNECE, 2009; UNEP, 2009ab). However, since 
BC is co-emitted with pollutants that are controlled by current legislation, a reduction in 
emissions by several sectors is expected in most of the Arctic countries, including Finland. 
This potentially removes the pressure from transport to control its emissions. However, the 
distribution of transport sources must be carefully evaluated, taking Arctic shipping and the 
use of off-road diesel machinery in the far north into account. The latter plays an important 
role since the typical lifetimes of off-road diesel engines are quite long and, therefore, 
additional retrofit and maintenance programs may have to be established to achieve the 
expected reductions. 
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5 INTERACTION WITH RUSSIA: ENERGY, FOREST SECTOR, 
ECOSYSTEMS AND ENVIRONMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
Huge natural resources are concentrated in Russian Arctic. Here is extracted about 80% of 
Russian gas, more 90% nickel and cobalt, 96% platinoides, 60% of copper etc. The mineable 
resources of carbohydrates on the Russian Arctic shelf comprise 100 billion ton of standard 
coal including 15.5 billion t of oil and 84.5 trillion m3 of gas, or 20–25 world resources of 
carbohydrates (www.minregion.ru). About 35% of the total deposits of oil are in remote 
regions with extreme transport conditions.  
The Finnish forest sector generates approximately 7% of the country’s GDP. Wood 
processing, the pulp and paper industry play a key role in Finland’s economy (approximately 
18% of the volume of industrial output and more than one-third of its export output). On 
average, 70% of forest products and 90% of paper are exported from Finland to 140 
countries. Finland is the second largest exporter of paper and cardboard in the world, and 
the fourth largest exporter of coniferous timber.  
The industrial capacity of Finland’s forest industry allows for the processing of approximately 
65–70 million m3 of round wood (75 million m3 before the economic crises). Currently, 85-
90% of required wood is supplied by the country’s own forests and 10–15% is imported; 
80% of the imported wood originates from Russia. Large forest industry companies purchase 
approximately 87% of required wood from external suppliers (61% from private Finnish 
owners and 26% from Russia). Russia exported 13.4 million m3 of wood to Finland in 2006, 
and 11.1 million m3 in 2007. Over 63% of the total volume is made up of deciduous wood, 
primarily birch wood for pulp production (in Finland, birch forests cover only 15% of the 
area). Thus, the impacts of climate change on both the Finnish and Russian forest sectors 
are of particular interest to understand the future of the supply of wood to the Finnish 
economy. 
Finland’s economic interest in Russian wood exports has an economic motive. Wood can be 
purchased relatively cheaper and wood imports decrease the price pressure of the national 
suppliers. According to information from the Russian Federal Customs Service, the average 
price for Russian industrial round wood (per 1 m3) rose from $57.7 in 1995 to $83.9 per m3 
in 2007. Finnish forest industry companies have invested about 1 billion EUR in Russia over 
the last two decades. 
Currently, Russia earns over 500 million EUR annually from timber exports to Finland. About 
half of the total amount of wood imported from Russia is pulpwood, for which there is only 
little market demand in Russia. The export of wood products secures around 40,000 jobs in 
the Russian forest sector (in addition to jobs in wood transport). Round wood is imported 
from northwestern Russia, mostly from Karelia Republic, Vologda and Novgorod oblasts. 
According to several studies, the share of round wood in Russian wood exports was approx. 
60% (51 million m3 in 2006, of which around 85% was bought by the three leading pulp and 
paper manufacturers worldwide– China, Japan, and Finland), and 53.7 million m3 in 2007 (for 
comparison, Canada exports approx. 2% industrial round wood, while Finland and Germany 
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export 1.1%). In 2007, round wood exports comprised 47% of all of Russia’s wood products 
export. These numbers do not include unaccounted (i.e., illegal) export, which is estimated 
at above 20% of the official trade and is especially high in the Russian Far East and North 
East. 
Future needs for Russian wood imports to Finland will largely depend on the possibility of 
Finnish forests to increase the domestic harvest of wood. There are currently 52 cellulose, 
paper and board plants based in Finland. If the Finnish pulp and paper industry uses 90–95% 
of its current capacity, the consumption of wood would thus comprise 55–60 million m3 of 
round wood annually. Despite effective developments in advanced technologies oriented 
toward the production of biofuel, biocomponents and biochemicals in the country, it is very 
likely that the consumption of round wood in Finland will not decrease over the next two-
three decades. 
Numerous national Finnish studies (e.g., project FINADAPT, 
http://www.ymparisto.fi/default.asp?contentid=227529&lan=en&clan=en) indicate that the 
expected climate change will generally be favorable for the Finnish environment, agriculture 
(e.g., Peltonen-Sainio et al., 2009a,b,c) and forest sector, due to the lengthening of the 
growing season and improvement of thermal and hydrological conditions. Scenario A2 
presumes that the total physiologically active growing season temperature will increase by 
almost 500 degree-days by 2080. 
With regard to the forests, a substantial improvement in their growing conditions is 
anticipated, which will accelerate their growth rate and productivity, particularly of deciduous 
tree species. Climate change and proper forest management could increase the amount of 
carbon in Finnish forests by 17–34% (Matala et al. 2009).  
The negative consequences of expected climate change include the increasing damage of 
forests by insects and shifting of this problem further northward. This impact will likely not be 
too strong and could be offset by proper mitigation measures. A special feature of the 
northern forests could thus be diminished. Winter heat spells may provide unfavorable 
physiological effects, and the timber felling conditions might become more hazardous.  
The increasing occurrence of extreme weather events (wind, snow, fire) poses several risks 
for forests. Forest fire is currently not a critical issue for Finland. However, the forest fire 
potential is expected to increase by the end of this century, especially in southern Finland 
(Kilpeläinen et al. 2009). The annual number of forest fire alarm days will likely increase 
about twice (96–160 days compared with the currently 60–100 days). The expected increase 
in the annual frequency of forest fires across the entire country will be approximately 20% 
higher by the end of this century, with the greatest increase occurring in the southernmost 
part of Finland, where six to nine fires will occur annually per 1000 km2 (i.e., a 29% 
increase). 
On the whole, Finnish forests will substantially increase their potential for supplying round 
wood. From other side, it’s necessary take into account some forecasts which state the 
decrease by up to a third the pulp and paper industry production and by a fifth the wood 
processing production from 2007 to 2020 (Hetemäki & Hänninen 2009). However, it is very 
likely that the demand for Russian wood imports will remain at the current level and may 
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even be increased due to (1) likely increase of areas of protective forests in Finland with a 
restricted regime of industrial harvest; (2) specifics of both forest ownership in Finland and 
the system of procurement of wood by the Finnish forest industry; (3) the need for wood 
from particular tree species, specifically deciduous; and (4) economic considerations 
assuming the development of the Russian forest sector and an increase in its capacity to 
deliver relatively inexpensive wood. Thus, we suppose that the Russian forest sector will 
continue to play an important role in the future supply of Finland with round wood. 
5.2 Potential 
Russia has vast forest resources – 797 million ha of forest and 84 billion m3 of growing stock 
volume. The Annual Allowable Cut (AAC, the norm of sustainable harvest) is defined at 597 
million m3 (2008) of which 302 million m3 are in European Russia and 295 million m3 in 
Siberia and the Far Eastern Federal Okrugs. The AAC consists of 313 million m3 of coniferous 
and 284 million m3 of deciduous wood. The average increment of major forest forming 
species in Russia comprises about 1 billion m3 of which approximately 380 million m3 are in 
the European part. 
The peak of Russia’s harvest was in the mid-1980s (around 350 million m3/year). Currently, 
Russia ranks third among countries whose harvest exceeds 150 million m3/year (approx.180 
million m3/year of commercial wood over the last three years). The current AAC is estimated 
at around 24% for the entire country, 30–40% in European Russia, and 15–20% in Siberia 
and the Russian Far East. However, the AAC in Russia also includes substantial areas of 
forest that are not accessible due to underdeveloped infrastructure or because they are 
protected (according to different estimates, AAC applies to about 50% of the entire country). 
From the Finnish perspective, the most important factors include forest, forest management 
and the forest industry of Russia’s North-West (9 administrative regions of the North Western 
Federal Okrug). According to official statistics, 18.8 million m3 of round wood was exported 
from the North-West in 2006, mostly to Scandinavian countries. 
The forest resources of Russia’s North-West are characterized by the following features:  
o forests cover 52.3% of the region’s total area (88 million ha with a growing stock of 
10 billion m3); an average increment of around140 million m3; roughly 65% of the 
area is represented by forests which are available for industrial harvest; coniferous 
forests cover 76%, deciduous 24% of the area; mature and overmature stands 
encompass nearly half of the area;  
o in recent years, the actual harvest in the region was 42–44 million m3/year, including 
84% of the final harvest, 7% thinning, and 9% other harvest); these numbers do not 
include illegal (“unaccounted”) harvest (20–25%); 
o AAC applies to 45% of all species and 60% of coniferous; the highest level applies to 
the Republic Karelia at 75%); 
o the quality of forests has decreased over the last 50 years; over 50% of the forest 
have a relative stocking of 0.6–0.4, the yield of round wood for lumber decreased by 
8–10%; deconcentration of industrially valuable stands is continuously decreasing; 
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o road density in the North-West is very low and varies from 1.2 km/1000 ha in the 
Komi Republic and 11.6/1000 ha in Pskov oblast’; the construction of new roads 
remains negligible; 
o a substantial part of logging is provided by obsolete machinery and technology; labor 
productivity is very low (about 1/5 in the wood processing industry, 1/3 in the 
production of pulp and paper, and 2/3 in plywood production – compared with the 
level of Scandinavian countries); prime costs of harvested wood comes close to those 
of Finland; 
o there is an evident lack of tradition in intensive management of forest resources; the 
governance of forests has declined significantly, particularly after the introduction of 
the new Forest Code (2006). 
A number of Russian and Finnish analyses indicate that the available forest resources in the 
North suffice to provide a total harvest of 40–50 million m3 in mature and overmature forests 
for the next 50 years. This amount could be substantially increased, if intensive forest 
management were introduced in Russia. The biological potential of intermediate harvest 
(thinning, different types of selective and gradual cutting) is enormous, at the level of about 
200 million m3/year in European Russia. The European Forestry Institute reported 
significantly higher reserves – at the level of 400 million m3 
(http://www.metla.fi/julkaisut/workingpapers/2009/mwp134.htm); however, this exceeds the 
gross growth of forests of European Russia – a recent estimate lies at approximately 380 
million m3/year. This resource is practically not being used at the moment. 
Huge forest resources are also found in Privolzhsky, Ural and the Siberian Federal Okrugs. 
However, the possibility of extended use of these resources and their inclusion in 
international trade will depend on future developments in the national economy and 
transport infrastructure in Russia. A substantial increase in wood exports from Siberia will 
depend on the future state of the Arctic Sea Route. 
5.3 Prospectus: Impacts of climate change 
Despite substantial differences in modeling predictions of future climates, the main 
tendencies with regard to climate change impacts on the terrestrial ecosystems and on 
forests in the territory of Northern Eurasia, in particular, can be aggregated as following:  
(1)  geographical and landscape changes of areas suitable for the growth of certain plants, 
particularly tree species (shift or disappearance of some productive species);  
(2)  increase or decrease of stability, vitality, and productivity of agricultural and forest 
ecosystems; it is expected that the warming trend will support the productivity of 
agriculture and forests in major regions of Northern Eurasia (Sirotenko & Abashina, 
2008); 
(3)  climatic models predict that bioclimatic potential for agriculture will substantially 
increase in European Russia, the Russian Far East and West Siberia. However, analyses 
of extreme climate events predict that the main food-producing regions in the south will 
experience an increase in the number of poor harvests – this number will double by 
2020 and triple by 2070 (Alcamo et al., 2003); 
(4)  on the whole, the productivity of forests in the territories of the forest zone will likely 
increase, although there is doubt that the trend of recent decades (increase of around 
+0.5%/year) will continue; 
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(5)  increasing summer aridity of the climate in southern and Asian continental regions will 
very likely provide mostly negative impacts on forest ecosystems;  
(6)  bioclimatic models predict considerable changes in vegetation cover by the end of this 
century, particularly in Siberia; according to some forecasts (which are based on the 
IPCC climatic predictions), the forest area of Central Siberia is predicted to shrink 
twofold ; the border between the forests and steppes would shift 10 degrees north of its 
current position; the steppe area in southern Siberia will increase by 30% with a twofold 
extension of desertified steppes (Tchebakova et al., 2003); 
(7)  a substantial rise in the instability of regional weather (increasing length of dry summer 
periods, intensity of precipitation during, etc.) will generate risks of droughts and floods, 
and negatively impact the productivity of terrestrial ecosystems; 
(8)  expected changes of the ecosystem’s ecological functions (e.g., impacts on 
biogeochemical cycles and on biodiversity);  
(9)  increase or decrease in nutrient retention and turnover;  
(10)  changes in species’ reproduction cycles, regularities of succession dynamics, and 
changes in environmental and social services (e.g., shifting values of the forest 
ecosystem as a tourist attraction); and 
(11)  the thawing of permafrost will generate diverse but clearly negative impacts on 
ecosystems.  
The current realities of social and economic development of North Eurasia, which are 
accompanied by the destructive anthropogenic impacts on the environment and natural 
landscapes may substantially accelerate the negative consequences of climatic change. 
Siberian regions serve as a typical example. Siberia functions as a basic “storage room” of 
Russia’s natural resources. Nearly 85% of Russian natural gas reserves are found in Siberia, 
as is over 90 and 75% of its coal and lignite, respectively, over 95% of its lead, approx. 90% 
molybdenum, platinum and platinoids, and about 80% of the country’s diamonds, 75% gold, 
70% nickel and copper; 50% of its tin and zinc, etc. (Korytnyi, 2009). The region also has 
vast resources of renewable energy. For instance, the capacity of the hydroelectric power 
stations of the Angara-Yenisey basin comprises half of the capacity of all hydroelectric power 
stations of Russia. 
Current methods for industrial exploitation of the northern territories do not present an 
optimistic future with regard to the interactions of industry and environment in North Eurasia. 
The level of atmospheric pollution and soil contamination in major regions of intensive oil and 
gas extraction has exceeded all acceptable limits. The rate of contamination of some regions 
(West Siberia, north of Krasnoyarsk Kray) has been rising. The quality of river water, 
particularly in regions with maximal density of population, does not correspond to the norms 
of water use for drinking and fisheries. 
Man-made impacts and changes are widespread in the high latitudes of Russia, particularly in 
its Asian part, in regions characterized by intensive extraction and exploration of fossil fuel 
(oil and gas) and the use of other natural resources (wood, metals, etc.). On the whole, over 
30% of the explored reserves of Russian oil and about 60% of its natural gas are found in 
permafrost regions. 
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The current governance of natural resources (in particular, forests), and the control of the 
use of natural resources have fallen below a critical level (e.g., Musin, 2007). The impacts of 
toxic anthropogenic water contamination, the decline of the human immune system, 
increasing stresses, impacts of many negative social phenomena connected, among others, 
to the intensification of migration processes, with a high probability that the negative impacts 
of climatic change on the standards of the population’s life and health will accelerate, as well 
as on the further economic and social developments. For example, in regions of West Siberia 
with active oil and gas companies (data from “Russian Federation”, 2006): (1) annually, up 
to 35,000 of the oil pipelines used in northern regions for intensive oil and gas extraction 
break; (2) of the 35,000 pipelines, approx. 300 have officially registered oil spills with 
>10,000 t for each; (3) over 15% of the tundra surface has been destroyed; and (4) the 
physical destruction of natural landscapes has exceeded >30% of total areas of the 
territories of central and southern taiga. A substantial part of these accidents is caused by 
melting permafrost. In the territories of the Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous Okrug (official 
regional report on State of Environment, 2004): (1) all rivers of the Ob’-Irtysh basin are 
categorized in the 5th and 6th class of water quality, i.e., “dirty” or “very dirty”; the 
concentration of the combination of Fe, Mn, oil products, etc. exceeds the maximum 
concentration of pollutants by several ten-folds; (2) the ecological state of environment 
causes 80% of disease in the region; (3) parasitic contamination of water and fish has 
substantially increased over the last decades; and (4) a clear destructive impact of industrial 
intervention on the life of indigenous nations is evident. 
The utilization and use of oil casing-head gas is unsatisfactory. According to different 
estimates, between 15 to 25 billion m3 of such gas is burnt in torches annually (Krukov & 
Tokarev, 2009). The Government Commission on Fuel and Energy Complex reported that the 
amount of extracted casing-head gas in 2007 comprised 61.2 billion m3 of which 16.7 billion 
m3 were burnt in torches. 
A demonstrative example of the possible negative impacts of the destruction of permafrost is 
the break of the oil pipeline in the Usinsky district of the Komi Republic in 1994, when about 
200.000 t of oil spilled (Erzev et al., 2000). The part of the pipeline that had broken crossed 
an area of discontinuous permafrost with a temperature close to 0oC, across the bogs which 
did not exist in the mid-1970s. 
Natural disturbances will very likely impact terrestrial ecosystems in a visibly negative way. 
The warming over the last two decades has provided striking examples of the possible 
acceleration of disturbances in North Eurasia. According to satellite assessments, the annual 
area of vegetation fires in Asian Russia exceeded 10 million ha between 1997 and 2007. The 
areas of wild fire on forested land in 1998 comprised about 12 million ha in 1998 and 17 
million ha in 2003. The amount of consumed fuel and severity of the fire were very high. 
Carbon emissions were estimated at 160–210 Tg C in 1998, and about 270 Tg C in 2003 
(e.g., Kaiji et al., 2003).  
The irreversible character of the changes in forest ecosystems and the transformation of 
historically stabilized ecological processes become evident following so-called catastrophic 
fires (Yefremov & Shvidenko, 2004). Such fires provide irreversible change to ecotopes (for 
the given period, over several hundred years), as well as long-term environmental impacts 
on natural landscapes as a whole, dramatically impact major biogeochemical cycles, and 
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often cause “green desertification” over large territories. There is evidence that the frequency 
and severity of catastrophic forest fires in different regions of North Eurasia has increased  
2–3-fold over the last decades. These fires have a dramatic impact on biodiversity (Kulikov, 
1998). Climate change is a major reason for this, but a clear link exists between the 
increased magnitude of catastrophic fires and enhanced anthropogenic impacts.  
In general, the long-term environmental consequences of catastrophic forest fires become 
apparent through: (1) a significant (up to several times) decrease in the biological 
productivity of forest lands due to the destruction of the indigenous ecotopes and 
replacement of indigenous vegetation formations; (2) the substantial decline in the industrial 
potential of forests for the period of around 100 years; (3) irreversible changes in the 
cryogenic regime of soils and rocks; (4) the change of the long-term amplitude of 
hydrothermal indicators beyond natural fluctuation; (5) changes of multi-year average 
hydrothermal and bio-chemical indicators of aquatic and sediment runoff, as well as of 
hydrological regimes and channel processes of water streams; (6) the accumulative impacts 
on atmospheric processes resulting in the acceleration of global climate change; (7) the 
promotion of large-scale outbreaks of insects and disease; (8) the irreversible loss of 
biodiversity, including rare and threatened flora and fauna species; (9) the long-distance 
transfer of pyrogenic products; and (10) the change of historical migration routes of 
migratory birds, ground, and water animals. 
There is a clear statistical link between the deforestation of lands and the forest fire 
occurrence rate. On average, a 1% increase in the forest fire occurrence rate in the taiga 
regions will cause a 6–10% decrease in the percentage of forest cover. According to 
estimates, over the last 50 years, catastrophic or recurrent forest fires have increased the 
total area of deforested lands in Asian Russia by approx. 20 million ha. Such lands are 
comprised of up to 70% bogs, 15% grass-shrub lands, 10% open woodlands, and up to 5% 
of stone fields and stone outcrops (Sheingauz, 2001; Yefremov & Shvidenko, 2004). Fires of 
such magnitude should be considered pyrogenic disasters beyond a regional context, with 
century-long biotic, environmental, and socio-economic consequences. 
Climate change is linked to the profound transformations of biotic processes. In particular, 
Khabarovsk Kray recently faced a severe outbreak of gypsy moss (Limantria dispar) on an 
area of some 8 million ha. There is evidence that this phenomenon is an after effect of the 
pyrogenic disaster of 1998. It is worth noting that the synergism of fire and biotic 
disturbances is typical for the whole of Northern Eurasia. The outbreak of Siberian moth 
(Dendrolimus superans sibiricus) impacted between 8 and 10 million hectares of larch stands 
in 2001–2002 in NE territories where such outbreaks had never before been observed (north 
of Zabaikale, Saha Republic). 
On the whole, the risks for terrestrial ecosystems, agriculture and forestry initiated by climate 
change and anthropogenic activities could be described as: (1) negative processes linked to 
the destruction of permafrost, including the physical destruction of sites, thermokarst, 
solifluction; (2) loss of soil fertility due to water erosion, soil compaction, desertification, lack 
of nutrients, salinization, increasing water table and other changes in water regime, soil 
contamination; (3) impoverishment of soil biota, decline in productivity of lands; (4) lack of 
water resources in arid regions; (5) damage of agricultural lands in river valleys due to an 
increase in inundation; (6) anomalous outbreaks and spatial distribution of traditional and 
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new insects and microorganisms; (7) alteration of the forest fire regime; (8) loss of 
biodiversity; (9) “green” desertification, and (10) impacts of air pollution, soil and water 
contamination. 
Permafrost degradation. Modeling studies on permafrost behavior in the 21st century predict 
a substantial decrease in the total area of permafrost; the area of continuous permafrost will 
likely decrease by 25–50% by 2080 (Anisimov & Beloluzkaya, 2003). Intensive development 
of thermokarst, gully formation, landslides, solifluction, floods, paludification (or aridity, 
depending on geographic distribution and landscape peculiarities, with northern steppization 
and “green desertification”) is expected for large areas, especially for continuing ice-rich 
grounds (which cover about 35% of Yakutia and 35–40% of north-eastern Russia). According 
to predictions made by the Permafrost Institute in Yakutsk, lake and swamp cover may 
increase (by 1.3–3 times in a scenario of future moderate warming by +3  C) is non-uniform 
in different regions of Asian Russia. If the observed warming trend Δt0 ≥ 0.06  C yr-1 
continues, unprecedented changes in the geocryological, landscape and ecological conditions 
are very likely in high latitudes of Northern Eurasia. 
Permafrost and the wetlands of Northern Eurasia contain a huge amount of carbon: Available 
estimates range from 400 to 900 Pg C. The organic carbon of permafrost sediments varied 
between 0.6% and 4.9% and was characterized by an increasing humification index with 
permafrost depth, and a high CH4 concentration was found in the top 4 m layer (Wagner et 
al., 2007). Warming may trigger dangerous acceleration of major biogeochemical cycles at 
the expense of a thermal increase in carbon emissions (as СО2, СО, and СН4). Hydrates of 
the Northern Seas are a second potentially large source of greenhouse gases. 
Impoverishment of fragile (pseudo-equilibrium) ecosystems of high latitudes. A number of 
ecosystems, particularly of northern latitudinal and altitudinal ecotones, are facing a specific 
threat from global change. Degradation of cryoxerogenic landscapes of high latitude in Asian 
Russia could serve as an example. These landscapes suffer from salinization, an increase in 
alkalinity, water, wind, and thermokarst erosion. Today, 40% of hay fields in Yakutia suffer 
from surplus salinity and 50% of pasture has undergone digression of different extent. It is 
very likely that the specifics of on-going and expected climate change will accelerate these 
processes. 
Acceleration of natural disturbances. It is also very likely that predicted climate change will 
provoke a dramatic increase in the extent, severity, and frequency of vegetation fire and 
insect outbreaks. A combined impact of fire and other anthropogenic and natural 
disturbances will accelerate the process of green desertification (current estimates are that 1 
to 2 million ha per year have been lost to green desertification over the last decades). There 
is a threat of catastrophic fire seasons; over the last decade, such catastrophic fire seasons 
occurred in 1998 and 2003. Global experience shows that even countries that are very 
advanced in forest fire protection are not able to provide the satisfactory extinguishing of 
forest fires in the catastrophic years. 
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Risks for coastal areas and marine ecosystems. The increasing sea level and flooding of 
coastal areas, the change in the salinity regime of low reaches of rivers, the change in 
ecological processes in deltas, and the substantial intensification of processes of coastal 
erosion will negatively impact coastal and delta ecosystems. The rate of acceleration of 
decreasing sea ice and the shrinking ice cover of the Arctic Seas has already impacted the 
northern animal population. 
Changing the hydrological regime. Risks triggered by the change in the hydrological regime 
are region-specific. The transformation of the hydrological cycle including a change in runoff 
of large Siberian rivers will impact the condition and dynamics of the vast wetland territories 
of West Siberia and those north of the region. The decrease in water table in permafrost area 
in combination with the acceleration of the fire regimes will provoke processes of northern 
steppization and green desertification. A steady deficit of water resources will cause yield loss 
of agricultural crops and pastures in southern regions. 
Acceleration of emissions of greenhouse gases. Warming and direct and indirect 
anthropogenic impacts on natural landscape could lead to a substantial increase in emissions 
of greenhouse gases (mostly CO2 and CH4). Currently, even if the significant increase in 
disturbances is taken into account, terrestrial ecosystems of Siberia continue to serve as a 
net carbon sink at a level of 20–40 g C m-2 year-1. However, it remains unclear to what 
extent the warming of permafrost areas has affected the budgets of greenhouse gases 
during the last decade.  
Ecosystems and human health. It is very likely that climatic changes will impact human 
health and living conditions in a visibly negative way, both directly and indirectly, through 
changes in the ecosystem. The direct impact includes increasing severity and frequency of 
extreme climatic phenomena, such as flooding, increasing wind, and – in southern parts of 
the region – a rise in the number of hot days, heat waves, and longer and more intensive dry 
periods. Additionally, warming increases the danger of infectious diseases, particularly those 
which are spread by insect-carriers or by water. Severe intensification of epidemic processes 
caused by intestinal infection in the south (sometimes up to unprecedented levels), 
increasing parasitic and non-infection pathology, and an evident northward shifting of the 
areas of carriers of infection, are already being observed in different regions of Siberia. 
Likewise, negative impacts of global change on the region’s ecosystems (particularly 
agriculture and forest) will impact the well-being and standards of life of the local population. 
5.4 Adaptation, mitigation, and ecological safety 
The development and implementation of a preventive strategy of adaptation of landscapes 
and ecosystems to, and mitigation of, the negative consequences of global change could 
minimize the above-mentioned challenges and risks. The technical aspects of this process are 
well-known (e.g., IPCC, 2007). It includes relevant forms of management practices: 
Afforestation and deforestation, biofuel plantations and substitution through wood products, 
reduction of emissions from deforestation, improvement of forest management, and forest 
restoration within a degraded forest land (e.g., Robledo et al., 2008).  
However, these and other activities are closely tied to the overall problem of sustainable 
management of natural resources in Russia, economic and social development of the 
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territory, and ecological safety of the population. In essence, climate change should become 
one of the cornerstones of regional strategies for social and economic developments with 
inherently implemented global issues and links, building, inter alia, on the following major 
issues: 
o development of a concept of sustainable development for regions in high latitudes; 
such a concept should be based on a unified policy of ecological safety for all boreal 
and polar regions under the expected climatic, social, and economic changes; an 
important initial stage of transition to sustainable development is a system of 
activities which would allow to overcome the current ecological and nature 
management crises; 
o development of integrated observation systems over the entire circumpolar boreal 
biomes as an information base for integrated land use management under global 
change; these systems should provide early warnings of changes in the functioning 
Earth system and help recognize undesirable “surprises” in a timely manner, 
particularly in hot spot regions, e.g., permafrost regions; integration of ground 
observation (monitoring stations), multi-sensor remote sensing techniques and 
relevant ecological models is a cornerstone of such systems; 
o based on the global change challenges, reconsideration of existing and introduction 
of a new, relevant system of specially protected territories around the polar circle 
with ecologically relevant regimes of nature management; 
o taking into account that the forest in northern regions is a major stabilizing element 
of natural landscapes; the forest management paradigm requires substantial 
reconsideration – from a pure resource to a multi-service use of forests with a clear 
emphasis on environmental and protective services. It further requires a proper 
quantification of the “global utility” of forests, which would allow an understanding of 
the real value of forests in the contemporary world; 
o development of a new strategy, establishing a legislative and institutional background 
of forest fire protection; such a strategy should include the relevant preparation of 
boreal landscapes for the expected climatic change; 
o the problem of the interaction between humanity and nature in northern regions 
requires new ways of thinking and, in principle, new solutions for many issues – 
education, institutions, capacity-building, development and introduction of 
ecologically-friendly methods, machinery and technologies of industrial development 
in the northern territories; 
o the development of a legislative and normative base of adaptation and mitigation is 
an urgent issue at both the federal and regional levels; in this regard, the situation of 
the post-Kyoto implementation in the region is clearly unsatisfactory; 
o an as comprehensive as possible adoption of the Kyoto ideology/ mechanisms in 
different aspects (for obtaining heat and energy through modern technologies; full 
introduction of the biosphere in the post-Kyoto international process, etc.); 
o the management of major biogeochemical cycles (basically, carbon and nitrogen) 
should be considered as an inherent part of sustainable land use management 
(including agriculture, forestry, wetland management). 
However, all of the above-mentioned problems have not been properly considered in Russia, 
and, at best, remain a topic of discussion among politicians. A transition to sustainable 
development requires significant investments and political decisions. However, there are a lot 
of unresolved political, economic and social problems in Russia. The current system of 
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taxation has nothing in common with actual rental taxation (Nagaeva, 2009). The 
development of strategies for environmental protection is an essential component of any 
decent state policy. The lack of such a strategy in Russia in addition to the absence of a 
special government body responsible for implementing such a strategy, is one of the key 
reasons for the permanent deterioration of environment in Russia and the increasing 
negative impacts on it (Pryazhinskaya, 2009). The continuation of these tendencies has lead 
to an aggravation of the degradation of terrestrial and water systems, and has generated 
numerous undesirable consequences and risks. 
Russia faces substantial social and demographic problems. The population of the high 
latitude regions (including the European northern regions) has dramatically decreased during 
the last 20 years. The impoverishment of cultural and ethical norms is evident. The index of 
the development of human potential in the major boreal and polar regions in Russia has been 
consistently decreasing over the last decades (Mekush & Mekush, 2009). 
Land use – land cover change (LULCC) in the region was during the last decades mostly 
driven by economic processes and inherited behavior of destruction of natural resources 
systems. This is revealed by the impoverishment of forests and their decreasing quality over 
large areas (decreasing areas of valuable coniferous forests; restoration of forests through 
change of species; increasing area of burnt areas and dead stands, etc.), particularly in 
densely populated areas. On the other hand, the restoration potential of boreal forests 
remains very high; this has resulted in the restoration of disturbed areas and an 
encroachment of forests and shrubs in previously non-forest areas. Another typical feature of 
LUCC is the abandonment of agricultural land in the forest steppe and steppe zones of the 
region. Such lands are not included in any management activities and these territories are 
now transforming into weed- and disease-breeders.  
Decreasing the risks involved requires substantial improvements in available information. 
There is a lack of connections between economic development and impacts on the 
environment and spending of the natural capital. Traditional macroeconomic indicators 
reported for Russia do not account for the negative impacts of industry on the environment 
(Zabelina & Trynkona, 2009). There is evidently a need for the transition to an ecologically-
corrected GDP. This would require the introduction of advanced systems of coupled 
ecological and economic accounting (like NAMEA, SEEA). 
The future state of the environment and forest ecosystems in the Russian north, their 
impacts on the potential delivery of energy sources and wood from vast high latitude regions 
for domestic and international consumption will depend on the proper solution of the 
problems indicated above. 
5.5 Political and socioeconomic development 
Future Russian policies toward western countries are difficult to predict. In 2007, Russia 
announced an unprecedented regulation of the export of wood products, thereby introducing 
a mechanism of gradually increasing export duties. It was assumed that such a measure 
would support wood processing in the country. From 2006 to 2008, the Russian Government 
took a number of decisions that introduced tough regulations on the export of round wood, 
but later postponed the introduction of custom fees for round wood exports. Initially, export 
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fees were increased: 20% of the custom value of the wood, but not less than 10 EUR per 
m3was effective as of July 2007; in April 2008, 25%, but not less than 15 EUR per m3 was 
introduced, and, finally, the intention was to raise  the export fee to 80%, but not less than 
50 EUR per m3 (as of January 2009) However, the Russian Government has been forced to 
postpone the latest increase in custom fees to 2010 and 2011. Russian Prime Minister Putin 
stated at a meeting with the Finnish Prime Minister (in October 2009) that Russia would 
expand duty-free delivery of wood to Finland, particularly of deciduous wood for which there 
is no demand in Russia. 
This customs policy (together with the global economic crises) has affected exports of 
Russian wood to Finland. In the structure of export receipts, the share of round wood after 
2000 made up about one third of all exports while the share of the pulp and paper industry 
was less than 40%. This proportion has changed over the last years (e.g., in 2009, export of 
timber comprised 30.5% and round wood 55.4% of all exports). On the whole, Russian 
export of round wood decreased by 43.7% in 2009 compared with 2008. 
The losses caused by such a policy are evident for both countries. Finland needs around 10 
million m3 of deciduous wood annually from Russia in order for its pulp and paper industry to 
work effectively. However, increasing Russian custom fees prevent a further development of 
round wood export. 
Russian experts do not expect to achieve substantial success from this policy because of (1) 
the low capacity of the domestic market attributable to the absence of solvent demand 
(poverty of population), and (2) low competitive ability of end products (lack of 
modernization of the processing industry). These deficiencies are characteristic for Russia’s 
entire economy, which basically remains afloat through its exports of raw materials and semi-
processed goods. However, it is expected that export of round wood from Russia will 
decrease. If a new policy is introduced, Russian wood will lose its price competitive ability. 
According to expert opinions, Russia will remain a raw-material appendage of Europe and 
particularly Finland until at least 2015–2020. On average, Russia has 1.2 km of roads per 
1000 ha (that is 35 times less than in Finland), and 20–22 km/ 1000 ha in the fairly dense 
taiga regions. Expert calculations suggest that 3,000 km of roads with a hard surface need to 
be paved to provide effective transport to and from Russia’s forests. This would require 
investments in the range of 18 billion rubles annually (with the average cost of 1km road at 6 
million rubles (approx.$200.000). Based on estimates of the Russian Government, 12.500 km 
of forest roads need to urgently be constructed. Currently, about 200–300 km of roads are 
constructed annually. 
Numerous decisions on improvements of Russia’s forest sector (e.g., Concept of Strategy of 
Development of the Forest Industry Sector of the Russian Federation by 2020) are only 
materializing very slowly, and there is doubt that, e.g., the planned level of wood harvest of 
297 million m3/year will actually be reached by 2020. It is impossible to realize investment 
projects aimed at the development and modernization of the forest industry within a short 
time. Some Russian experts claim that over the next decades, Russia will inevitably have to 
maintain its role as a global exporter of round wood. Some estimates assert that investments 
of around 2 billion US dollars annually over the next 30 years are required to raise the 
Russian forest industry to the level of developed European countries. The current level of 
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investments in the Russian forest industry is very low, and this is not only a consequence of 
the economic crisis, but primarily attributable to the high level of risks and lack of stability, as 
well as the high level of criminalization and corruption in the country. 
There still is little evidence of substantial future progress in the modernization of the Russian 
forest sector. This would require profound reforms of the state’s economic policy, tax 
regulation, and serious institutional changes. 
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6 GLOBAL LONG-TERM SCENARIOS OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION-IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY, 
TRADE AND POLICY 
Long-term scenarios are an indispensable tool for the assessment of major uncertainties, as 
well as of the consequences of alternative policy actions for global challenges. A number of 
global and regional scenario exercises have been conducted that focus on scenarios in terms 
of alternative socioeconomic development pathways and the subsequent impact of these 
scenarios on energy structures and environmental (including climatic) impacts (e.g., IPCC, 
2007, WEO, 2007, etc.). This has also become increasingly relevant given the rising global 
concerns on preventing the impacts of dangerous climate change and the need for scenario-
based quantification of the implications of low climate stabilization, for energy systems, as 
well as the impacts on climate change. 
In this section of the report, we focus on two global scenarios with alternative socioeconomic 
dimensions and examine the development of energy systems in the future, along with the 
associated environmental consequences. We also discuss the need and implications of 
achieving climate stabilization at low levels, in particular through investments into energy 
systems, and the co-benefits for air pollution. While the scenarios are global in nature, we 
attempt to draw specific conclusions with respect to issues of importance within the Arctic 
and Finnish context-in particular energy resources, trade, technology and emissions.  
We use a set of long-term scenarios developed at IIASA as a starting point (Riahi et al., 
2007). These scenarios are a subset of the scenarios developed for the IPCC Special Report 
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC 2001), which were also used for a subsequent analysis 
of the feasibility of meeting a range of climate stabilization targets analyzed in the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report (TAR) (IPCC 2003), as well as within the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 
(Rao et al., 2004). These scenarios have undergone major numerical revisions in terms of 
socioeconomic assumptions (as detailed in Riahi et al., 2007). In addition, the scenarios 
encompass a multi-sector and multi-GHG perspective in which the integrated assessment 
paradigm is extended from the traditional focus on the energy sector to all other salient 
sectors (in particular agriculture and forestry) that emit GHGs or potentially contribute to 
climate change mitigation efforts through either emissions reductions or enhancements of 
GHG sinks. By a full coupling of the corresponding models that represent the energy, 
agriculture, and forestry sectors, we are not only able to consistently account for all GHGs 
and their respective mitigation potentials across the sectors2, but for important feedbacks 
and interdependencies (e.g., competition for land use) between sectors as well. The 
scenarios also incorporate previously unexplored mitigation options, such as the use of 
biomass in conjunction with carbon sequestration and storage (CSS), which could result in an 
artificial ‘sink’ for anthropogenic CO2 emissions in addition to traditionally considered forest 
sinks. These scenarios were used to explore a number of climate stabilization targets to 
determine the feasibility and costs of meeting alternative climate stabilization targets under a 
range of salient long-term uncertainties2. 
                                               
2  We also include additional low climate stabilization levels here in addition to those discussed in Riahi 
et al., 2007 
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To meet this objective, we have developed two contrasting scenarios, A2r and B1, that aim 
to bracket the upper and lower quadrants of emissions and hence the extent of both climate 
change and of the potential vulnerability to climate change. The following sections describe 
the socio-economic drivers of these scenarios and the resulting impacts on eneryg systems 
and greenhouse gas emissions in the future. 
6.1 Socioeconomic assumptions/impacts in current global energy-climate 
scenarios 
An important distinguishing feature of these future scenarios is the assumptions on long-term 
demographic and economic growth. In B1, a rapid demographic transition from high to low 
fertility leads to a low total population projection. This, combined with the assumed high 
levels of education and free access to knowledge, capital, and technology, enables 
developing countries in particular to make full use of their demographic opportunity window. 
Rates of economic growth accelerate with the progress of demographic transition and are 
assumed to peak at the demographic opportunity window (maximum of the second derivative 
of population growth). In turn, accelerated rates of modernization, as reflected in economic 
development catch-up, also feed back into demographic development, which maintains the 
rapid mortality and fertility transitions characteristic of the B1 scenario. Conversely, scenario 
A2r assumes a delayed demographic transition which leads not only to a high population 
projection, but also to a delay in the potential to fully use the demographic opportunity 
window for development catch-up. Global population increases from approximately 6 billion 
in 2000 to around 9 billion by 2050 (8.7 and 9.3 billion in B1 and B2, respectively) and 7 (B1) 
billion by 2100. The A2r scenario is characterized by an assumed delay in demographic 
transition by some two to three decades, which leads to a world population of approximately 
10 billion by 2050 and 12.4 billion by 2100. A comparison of the world population scenarios 
reported here with the original SRES study and the most recent population projections from 
IIASA and the UN is illustrated in Figure 31. 
Figure 31  World population, comparison of different scenarios.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reproduced from the Special Issue on Technological Change and Forecasting, 2007. 
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In terms of economic growth, the scenarios describe a world that is becoming more affluent, 
albeit at different rates and with different regional patterns. Global economic output (GEO) is 
estimated at USD 27 trillion (1990) at market exchange rates (MERs) in the year 2000. By 
2050, GEO ranges between USD 106 (A2r) to 150 (B1) trillion. By 2100, the corresponding 
scenario range lies between USD 204 (A2r) and 392 (B1) trillion, which signifies an increase 
of a factor ranging from 7 to 14 over a period of 100 years. However, despite the overall 
economic growth, the distribution of this growth varies significantly by scenario, with a more 
uneven distribution in the A2r scenario than in the prosperous B1 scenario (for further details 
on the methodology used for downscaling, please see Gruebler et al., 2007). 
Figure 32a  World GDP (Market Exchange Rate), 2100, A2r. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 32b World GDP (Market Exchange Rate), 2100, B1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The socioeconomic developments presented here can be expected to have significant impacts 
on future global energy use in terms of both the demand for energy, as well as the rates of 
technology deployment, especially of advanced technologies. This is particularly relevant for 
energy exporting regions like the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which is currently looking to 
expand its gas exports, as well as the number of energy importers Finland which will face 
increasing competition for resources in the future as developing countries like China look to 
increase their energy imports. The following section examines these impacts in more detail. 
  81
6.2 Future energy and environment implications 
Global energy use in the scenarios is projected to increase two to four-fold over the century, 
depending on differences in energy efficiencies and technological change. Developing 
countries are expected to consume 60–70% of the energy demand during this century, thus 
putting enormous pressure on energy resources. The two scenarios illustrate contrasting 
trends with regard to fossil and non-fossil energy use as presented in Table 12, with the A2r 
scenario depicting a mostly fossil-dependent future while the B1 scenario expects a shift to 
non-fossil energy. These scenario characteristics are discussed in more detail below. 
Table 12  Scenario characteristics. 
 2000 A2r B1 
Demand (FE), EJ 290 1250 800 
Technological change - Low High 
Energy Intensity Impr., %/year -0.7* -0.6 -1.7 
Carbon Intensity Impr., %/year -0.3* -0.3 -1.5 
Fossil energy (PE), EJ 340 1180 340 
Non-fossil energy (PE), EJ 95 1080 1160 
Emissions (Energy), GtC 7 27 6 
*Historical development since 1850 
An important assumption in both scenarios is the availability of fossil resources. Fossil fuel 
resource availability is differentiated by major fuel (coal, oil, and gas) as well as by resource 
category (especially conventional versus unconventional resources). Resource estimates of oil 
and gas as depicted in Table 13 include currently known reserves, as well as hitherto 
undiscovered ones. Current studies maintain that there are vast undiscovered potential 
resources in the Arctic region, for example (USGS, 2008). According to those estimates, the 
mean of the undiscovered gas resources of 25 Arctic provinces is about 46 tcm (excluding 
NGLs). However, as seen in Table 13, while these additional resources are significant, the 
large potential of unconventional gas resources already included in the scenarios, would 
imply that if production costs linked to Arctic gas were to decrease significantly in the future, 
this would mean a possible displacement of some of the existing unconventional gas’ 
potential, but not necessary affect the implications of the scenarios. For example, studies 
that include the possibility of methane hydrates indicate that they represent a potentially vast 
fossil fuel energy source that could provide up to 10 or 15% of global natural gas production 
within the next two decades (Krey et al., 2009). Thus, resource availability does not appear 
to be a constraining factor, even in the longer term, but the economics of oil and gas 
extraction and technological advancements will play a key role with regard to continued 
investments in this sector. 
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Table 13  Global oil and gas energy reserves, resources, and occurrences (in ZetaJoules). 
 Consumption Reserves 
identified 
Conventional 
resources 
remaining to be 
discovered 
Recoverable 
with 
technological 
progress 
Additional 
occurrences 
 1860-
1990 
1990  Low High   
Oil 3.35 0.13 6.3 1.6 5.9   
Conventional -- -- 7.1   9 >15 
Unconventional        
Gas        
Conventional 1.7 0.07 5.4 9.4 22.6  >10 
Unconventional - - 6.9   20 >22 
Hydrates - -     >800 
Arctic gas 
(USGS) 2008        1.794 
Sources: Nakicenovic et al., 1996; Nakicenovic, Grübler and McDonald, 1998; WEC, 1998; Masters et 
al., 1994; Rogner, 1997 
Assumptions on resource availability and technological change in the different scenarios 
determine how investments in the oil sector will evolve in the future. Fossil fuel use lies 
below resource availability in all scenarios, thus indicating that resource scarcity, albeit an 
important limiting factor for fossil fuel usage is not necessarily the only determinant for its 
use. As seen in Figure 33, the A2 scenario is characterized by high demand for and the 
rapidly growing pressure on fossil resources and the heavy dependence on oil for most of the 
century. With conventional oil becoming increasingly scarce, a shift toward more expensive 
unconventional oil sources takes place by 2050, with a doubling of investments and a further 
increase later in the century. The B1 scenario, which is based on a much lower energy 
demand and assumed higher rates of technological change, opts for alternatives to fossil 
fuels, causing the peak in coal and oil resources to occur much earlier. In general, the 
scenarios demonstrate that concerns about economic recoverability and the environment are 
more likely to initiate a future shift to other energy sources than are absolute resource 
constraints.  
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Figure 33  Oil and gas supply, B1 and A2 scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Natural gas and LNG in particular are expected to play a key role in the energy transition 
process over the next few decades, due to the advantages of natural gas as a relatively clean 
energy carrier. The competitiveness of gas as an energy source and the ability to find 
alternatives to gas are an important factor with reference to continued investments in this 
sector. In both scenarios, cumulative investments in the gas sector over the next 30 years lie 
in the range of USD 1–2 trillion3. This also highlights the significance of gas trade in the 
future, with gas-rich regions making large investments into production and transportation 
facilities. In addition, importing regions like Western Europe will also increase its investments 
in gas exploration and LNG facilities. This can be interpreted as the emergence of joint 
investments in gas facilities, with major importers making large-scale investments to facilitate 
the import of gas.  
Figure 34  Natural gas fuel shadow prices in the A2r scenario.  
                                               
3  The IEA (2004) estimates that approximately USD 3 trillion cumulative gas sector investments will 
have been made by 2030. 
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In the A2r scenario, fossil fuel prices increase (see, for example, natural gas prices in Fig. 34) 
due to the rise in energy demand and progressive depletion of low-cost fossil resources, 
especially in conjunction with ever-more stringent climate constraints. Technological 
innovation will be key in substantially lowering the costs of the current expensive 
alternatives. Alternative fuel use, including bio-liquids, fossil (coal and gas) based liquids, and 
hydrogen will be particularly important in regions that are dependent on oil and gas imports 
like Western Europe4. The increasing fuel prices will imply that such alternative fuels will be 
particularly important in filling the fossil fuel gap in the long term. 
Figure 35  Synthetic fuel use in Western Europe (2000–2100). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investments in the oil and gas sector in the long term thus largely depend not only on fuel 
prices, but also on technological change in the energy system that supports the shift from oil-
based fuels to alternatives. Synthetic fuels can substitute fossil-based fuels in many 
applications and can thus potentially play an important role in future energy supply. They 
assume special importance in regions that have rich coal, gas or biomass resources, since 
synthetic fuels only produce a fraction of the emissions generated by the consumption of 
normal gasoline or diesel fuels  
Rising energy prices and the emergence of fossil alternatives can also be expected to 
significantly impact energy trade, which is also projected to undergo a transformation in the 
future. Figure 36 depicts future natural gas exports in both the A2r and B1 scenarios and the 
different cases of climate stabilization. The B1 scenario presents an overall decrease in gas 
imports in the future in all cases, while the A2r scenario continues to rely heavily on natural 
gas, even under more stringent climate stabilization constraints, thus indicating that it will be 
indispensible to increase energy efficiency and invest into technological innovations that can 
deliver alternatives, if the critical issue of fossil fuel imports is to be tackled. This has 
particular implications for climate mitigation policies of energy importing countries like 
Finland which should emphasize the role of such technological innovation in order to 
simultaneously reduce GHG emissions and dependence on energy imports. 
                                               
4  According to IEA (2007), all fossil fuels required in Finland are imported, with net imports of 
electricity reaching 15–20% of total consumption, depending on the rainfall in the Nordic area. Of 
particular concern are imports from Russia, which supplies the entire country’s gas, nearly all of its 
oil and 10% of its electricity.  
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Figure 36  Global natural gas exports from former Soviet Union, 2000–2100, Billion m3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electricity generation profiles are also expected to change in the future in order to respond to 
rising fossil fuel prices and the need to respond to climate change. Figure 37 illustrates the 
response to a 450 ppm CO2-equivalent target under the A2r and B1 scenarios. It is 
anticipated that low carbon options like nuclear and renewable based electricity will play a 
major role in regions like Western Europe in the future to mitigate climate change, although 
the extent of these options may vary depending on the technological choice and costs. These 
results indicate that current national policies in countries like Finland, which support an 
increase in the contribution by nuclear power, as well as the adoption of more renewable 
energy (in particular biomass) can be compatible with low climate futures. 
Figure 37  Electricity generation, Western Europe, A2_450 and B2_450. 
 
 
 
 
Biomass can be an important source of energy through the direct use of biomass, as well as 
bioliquids which can be used to substitute oil products in certain areas such as transport. The 
scenarios include a detailed presentation of different price-based bioenergy potentials in the 
different regions, taking into account land constraints and food demands (for a more detailed 
discussion, see Riahi et al., 2006). We observe that an increase in fossil fuel prices implies 
that biomass becomes more competitive. An additional factor of biomass-based energy is 
that it is essentially carbon neutral (within short timeframes) and can thus play an important 
role in reducing GHG emissions. The importance of advanced technologies like biomass 
energy in combination with carbon capture and storage (BECS) is expected to increase in 
light of more stringent climate targets, due to their large potential in reducing the overall 
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costs of mitigation. Results from our analysis also indicate that the implementation of climate 
policies may lead to fundamental changes in the economics of the agriculture and forestry 
sectors. This concerns, in particular, new markets and business opportunities through 
additional revenues from afforestation and bioenergy activities in these sectors (e.g., through 
GHG permits). This can be a significant economic boost for countries like Finland which 
already derive a large part of their economic revenue from these sectors. 
Figure 38  Biomass use in Western Europe in A2_450. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus from the perspective of energy supply options, those with the highest degrees of 
versatility in the production of a large variety of fuels suited for different end-use applications 
(gases, liquids, and electricity) generally emerge as the most robust technology options in 
both scenarios. These are natural gas in the short term (if available) and biomass in the long 
term (produced outside the traditional energy sector, i.e., in agriculture and forestry). Other 
renewables (solar, wind, and hydropower) and nuclear power are important mitigation 
options, but their potential contribution may be limited by energy-conservation efforts, as 
well as by their integration into the overall energy systems architecture. 
The diverging patterns of energy use are reflected in the GHG emission profiles shown in 
Figure 38, with total carbon equivalent emissions ranging from 9–37 GtCequiv by the end of 
the century in the absence of specific climate policies. Compared with today’s emissions rate, 
the rate in the A2r scenario increases by more than 3 times, while that in the B1 scenario 
leads to slightly lower levels due to lower demands and higher technological change. The 
drivers for high and low emissions in the two scenarios are both scenario- and sector-
specific. For instance, the high carbon emissions in the A2r scenario are dominated by the 
high emissions of the energy sector, which are a result of the high increase in demand owing 
to the combined effects of high population growth and more limited efficiency improvements. 
These are coupled with slower rates of technology improvement that result from lower 
productivity growth. Conversely, the high emissions for CH4 and N2O in A2r result primarily 
from the rise in the demand for agricultural products, which reflects the dominance of this 
sector with reference to these two GHGs. 
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Figure 39  World GHG emissions, MtC equivalent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To achieve climate stabilization, the rates of decarbonization would have to be accelerated to 
beyond those of the baseline scenarios. Perhaps even more importantly, in order to achieve 
extremely low stabilization levels, emissions would have to be reduced to below zero levels. 
This implies in the most stringent stabilization scenario that, in addition to low emissions, 
extensive carbon management is also required in the form of carbon sequestration and 
disposal, as reflected in the negative values for carbon intensities toward the end of the 21st 
century. This indicates that a completely new paradigm is required for the conceptualization 
and development of such very low GHG scenarios of the future. 
Figure 40  Energy sector black carbon emissions, Western Europe, 2030. 
 
 
 
 
 
An important point is that climate mitigation policies, especially for stringent GHG reductions, 
can bring significant co-benefits by reducing air pollutants, as many GHGs and air pollutants 
are often emitted from the same sources. While the reduction of such local pollutants has 
obvious benefits in terms of environmental quality and health, quantifying such benefits is 
quite a complex task. One of the main reasons is the different spatial and temporal scales of 
GHG emissions as compared to local pollutants. Another factor is that the climatic impacts of 
GHGs and pollutants can often be very different, for example, SO2 has a cooling effect on 
the climate, and sulfur emissions reduction may imply an increase in global warming. While 
quantifying such benefits is difficult, it is plausible that accounting for such benefits while 
calculating the costs of climate mitigation can significantly change a particular region’s 
perception of the losses it may suffer from participating in climate mitigation efforts. Thus, it 
is necessary to carefully examine the linkages between climate policy and local pollutants in 
order to develop an integrated or multi-objective policy framework that produces the overall 
desired effects (Rao et al., 2005). 
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